The Antietam Journal

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A Publication of the Antietam Institute

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Editor

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Editorial Advisory Board

The Antietam Journal is a biannual publication of the latest research, interpretation, and stories of the Maryland Campaign of September 1862 that highlights the participants involved—soldier and civilian—and the lasting impact of the campaign on American history.

The Antietam Institute was established in 2021 as a member-based, educational, and philanthropic 501(c)(3) non-profit organization. The Institute educates the public on the central role of the Maryland Campaign of 1862 and Battle of Antietam as a major turning point of the Civil War that directly resulted in the issuance of the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. Antietam Institute-sponsored conferences, symposiums, publications, and leadership forums facilitate collaborative learning and knowledge exchange, create unique opportunities for discovery and inspire further historical research.

Manuscript Submissions

Send manuscript submissions to the editor at editor2@antietaminstitute.org. Feature articles should be approximately 10,000 words in length (including footnotes).

Cover image: Courtesy of Chris Heisey.

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The Editor's Column
by Kevin R. Pawlak

Winter is always the quietest time of year on the Antietam battlefield (especially with the winter weather we have had so far in 2025). There is not as much battlefield tromping to learn on the ground. Rather than bundling in layers to brave the cold, you will find many students of Antietam catching up on their reading lists and research projects this time of year, though occasionally a winter weather walker can be found on the trails (myself included).

While I have been researching Antietam topics vigorously this winter, my stack of to-be-read books includes few Antietam-related titles. This is not because of the lack of options—I just think sometimes it is good to step away from a certain topic and broaden our horizons once in a while. As I read books about other topics, my mind always takes me back to Antietam, thinking about how the current subject of my book relates to my latest research, writing, or a submission for *The Antietam Journal*.

I recently finished reading a book about the Battle of Waterloo, one of the great battles of the 19th century. Incredibly, that one day battle fought on June 18, 1815, was deadlier than September 17, 1862. No wonder there are so many books on the topic. Antietam, of course, has provided plenty of literature, too, especially recently. It is no surprise then that I found the Battle of Antietam lumped in with Waterloo in this post-battle quote from Surgeon Thomas M. Ebright, 8th Ohio Infantry: "Indeed like the great battles of Waterloo, Bunker Hill, Valley Forge or Trenton, it [Antietam] is destined to furnish material for volumes in years to come."[1]

You are holding the latest volume in your hands—incredibly, the eighth edition of *The Antietam Journal*. Inside, our authors touch on new topics related to the battle and battlefield. The Table of Contents for future journals are being planned now, so Ebright's prophecy will continue to come true.

None of these volumes would be possible without you, the readers and members of the Antietam Institute. Do you have suggestions or an article you want to submit for a future volume? Send me an email at editor2@antietaminstitute.org and make a contribution to the growing

1 "Letter from Dr. Ebright," September 24, 1862, in *Holmes County Farmer* (Millersburg, OH), October 9, 1862.

literature on the Battle of Antietam and the Maryland Campaign.

In this volume, longtime Antietam historian Tom Clemens shares interesting tidbits about commanders on both sides of the battlefield that are known for their less than desirous performances.

Wilson H. Beebe, Jr., traces the changing interpretive methods employed by the National Park Service over the years at Antietam National Battlefield.

Andy Cardinal edited the words of a United States Sharpshooter involved in the action at Miller's cornfield on that bloody morning of September 17, 1862.

Joseph Stahl and Matthew Borders share the story of a 12th Massachusetts lieutenant through the veil of an image of Lieutenant Arthur Dehon.

One of the greatest preservation successes ever at the battlefield was the purchasing and restoration of the Miller pasture, the triangle of land between the Hagerstown Turnpike, Smoketown Road, and Cornfield Avenue. Michael Hill takes readers on a guided walk through this incredible piece of battlefield land.

Learn more about the Snavely's Ford area of the battlefield with Bob Brooks in this volume's Institute Interview.

Lastly, Chris Vincent, the President of the Antietam Institute, shares images and the story of a former museum on the battlefield.

Enjoy this latest volume of *The Antietam Journal*. See you on the battlefield!

Kevin R. Pawlak

Antietam Institute Announcements

Antietam Institute Historical Research Center

We live in a digital age with thousands of sources at our fingertips. Unfortunately, there is rarely one place to go to find everything we are looking for. The Antietam Institute's website is now home to the Historic Research Center, a repository to collect and share digital copies of historical and contemporary material about the Battle of Antietam and the related Maryland Campaign.

The Historical Research Center has sources grouped into three categories: unit histories, images, and documents. This is a living resource that will continue to have sources added to it, so continue to visit the page to find more resources. Visit the Historical Research Center at https://antietaminstitute.org/hrc/s/HRC/page/welcome to find these valuable resources or to submit some of your own items for inclusion in this exciting digital resource.

Commanders of Antietam has been released!

We are pleased to announce that our next Membership book, *Commanders of Antietam*, has been released!

Commanders of Antietam, the Union and Confederate Commanders at the Battle of Antietam is a comprehensive look at the biographies of both armies' high command during the Maryland Campaign of September 1862. This treatment focuses on the lives of Union and Confederate commanders from the brigade level up to the army commanders, Robert E. Lee and George B. McClellan.

Each commander's biography is broken into three sections: Before the Maryland Campaign; During the Maryland Campaign; and After the Maryland Campaign. This is the most complete volume of commanders' biographies in the Maryland Campaign.

This book has been written by a collaboration of Antietam Battlefield Guides, National Park Service Rangers and volunteers, and Civil War historians. Kevin Pawlak and Brad Gottfried are the editors of this volume. It is the third in a series of books focused on different aspects of the campaign, including *Brigades of Antietam* (edited by Bradley Gottfried) and *Artillery of Antietam* (by James A. Rosebrock), both published by the Antietam Institute.

2025 Fall Conference, October 3-5, 2025: "Beyond the Battle: Civilians, Casualties, and Remembering the Bloodiest Day in American History"

On September 17, 1862, two large armies, over 100,000 men, clashed in the fields and farmland around Sharpsburg in the bloodiest one-day battle in American history. The result was over 23,000 casualties; killed, wounded or missing. Homes, churches, and barns became hospitals, some in operation for months. The Federal army occupied the area for six weeks, living off the land and using up what little resources had remained. Years later veterans returned to remember their experiences and visit where it occurred.

Join us for our three-day conference as we focus on the aftermath of the battle from the civilians' and veterans' perspective. We'll visit the farmsteads, hospital sites, the headquarters locations, and the communities of Sharpsburg and Shepherdstown to understand the crucial role the civilians played and the veteran's commemoration of the battle.

Details are coming soon and registration will open on April 12, 2025.

2025 Lecture Series

The Summer Lecture Series, formally hosted by the Jacob Rohrbach Inn, returns for its tenth year, now under the direction of the Antietam Institute.

The Summer Lecture Series is held in McKinley Hall at St. Paul's Episcopal Church in Sharpsburg, Maryland, every Monday evening at 7:00 p.m. The program starts on June 2 and runs through August 25. No advance registration is required and the lectures are free and open to the public.

The church is located at 209 West Main Street with a small parking area off the alley. More parking is available on Main and Hall Streets.

Each week we also hold a drawing for an autographed book or a Civil War print.

This year we have an amazing lineup of historians and scholars discussing their latest works and research about the Maryland Campaign and the Civil War.

Visit https://antietaminstitute.org/2025-summer-lecture-series/ for more information and the complete schedule of lectures.

Antietam's Less-than-Valorous Leaders
by Tom Clemens

Who is your favorite hero of the Battle of Antietam, or Sharpsburg? Major General Joseph Hooker galloping on his white horse, using his personal bravery to inspire his men? The personal courage of Colonel John B. Gordon, who made himself a conspicuous target, and refused entreaties of his men to go to the rear when his wounds became apparent? There were plenty of similar examples where leading from the front and personal bravery were displayed, and many men on both sides provided it.

Much less chronicled were those leaders, from generals to company officers, who in the critical moments, failed to lead, deserted their command, or shirked in the rear. Many leaders in the war lacked combat experience, and only a handful of regular or volunteer soldiers of the Mexican War were available to serve in the Union and Confederate armies. A good portion of those with experience and in the Civil War were too old for combat leadership or had been holding administrative positions. This lack of combat veterans to lead regiments, brigades, etc., brought many civilians to positions that, in the heat of battle, required the personal bravery to expose themselves conspicuously to enemy fire, and the ability to think clearly under stressful conditions. Success or failure in battle often depended on a commander's ability to lead his men into mortal danger.

Many officers in the war were civilians when the war broke out, and many were chosen due to their social, political, or financial status. While understandable, it also put men in positions which required a type of gallantry they had never been called to provide in civilian life. Thus, it is not surprising so many failed, sometimes at critical moments, to provide the leadership that might have made the difference between success and failure. Due to prevailing Victorian era sensibilities, those leaders who failed the test of combat were seldom mentioned or were publicly vilified.

Yet the survivors confided in Antietam historian Ezra Carman. After 30 years or more, some of them offered assessments they did not vocalize at the time, at least not officially. Some of those named as lacking fortitude were dead when the accusations were made, perhaps allowing the critics a better opportunity to speak about them. Others were still alive though, showing the critics were willing to speak up despite potential retaliation. What follows are the comments made by many former

soldiers, both men in the ranks and officers, about various leaders at Antietam. Some of these accounts may be exaggerated, or foggy and vague, but my intent is not to evaluate, but simply to make their opinions public.

Brigadier General Samuel Crawford

Starting at the highest level of command, Brigadier General Samuel Crawford went into the battle commanding a brigade in the 1st Division, 12th Corps, but due to the mortal wounding of corps commander Brigadier General Joseph K. F. Mansfield, Crawford became commander of the 1st Division as Brigadier General Alpheus Williams assumed command of the corps.[1] Williams was one of Crawford's earliest and most vocal critics. In April 1863, Williams wrote a long letter to General. George B. McClellan, pointing out that McClellan's preliminary report of the campaign slighted the accomplishments of the 12th Corps, and the only general mentioned by name was Crawford. In that letter Williams stated, "That there was no such line as 'Crawford's line,' that General Crawford's [division] not only did not form a line, but he did not give a command to either of the two Brigade commanders of the 1st Division during the day. I say this on their repeated assertions."

Addressing Crawford's wounding at Antietam, Williams had this to say:

> Your report couples the name of Crawford with that of Sedgwick in a manner to lead to the inference that they were wounded in the same charge. This is quite a mistake. It was as late as 2 o'clock, I think if not later, that General Crawford coming from toward the rear alone, reported that he had received a slight wound. He showed me what seemed a very small puncture in the thigh and said somebody had shot him from a cornfield with a fowling piece. I had seen General Crawford but once before, during the battle. He came to me again during the early evening said he should be obliged to go to the rear, but

1 Samuel W. Crawford, of Fayetteville, Pennsylvania, after attending medical school, entered the United States Army in 1861 as an assistant surgeon. He was promoted to surgeon and was present at Fort Sumter when it was attacked in 1861. He was made a brigadier general of volunteers in April 1862 and commanded troops throughout the war, serving credibly at Gettysburg in 1863, where there is now a statue of him.

> would return in the morning. He has never rejoined his command. No surgeon here ever saw this wound which proved so much more serious than General C. himself anticipated. He did not pretend that it was received in any charge and I am quite positive he could not have been. I have not met the first officer of the division he ought to have commanded after General Mansfield fell, to whom he gave the first important order or who saw him three times during the day. I can myself testify though, I assisted in deploying the new undrilled regiments of his brigade, and in rallying them when broken. I never saw General Crawford as I remember but once from the commencement of the action to the time he reported his wound in the afternoon.

Williams ended his complaint by saying that Crawford sent him numerous questions in preparing his report of the battle, but never submitted it to Williams, instead sending it directly to McClellan. This was, of course, a breach of military protocol. Williams sent a copy of this letter to Carman to use in his work as historian of the Antietam Battlefield Board. Carman appended a hand-written note to the end of Williams' letter; "General Crawford had it reported in the Philadelphia papers that he was wounded while rallying my Regiment. I saw Gen. C. but once that day and then he was safely ensconced behind a ledge of rocks where nothing could touch him. E. A. C."

Other veterans chimed in about Crawford's lack of valor. Major John M. Gould was a veteran of the 10th Maine Infantry and a prolific historian, particularly about the actions of the 12th Corps at Antietam. He devoted much time and money in collecting sources from men in the 12th Corps, and he often shared his sources with Carman. In an 1898 letter to Carman, Gould stated, "I have had a great deal of talk with my own men & it is a common understanding that the 28 N. Y. & 46 P. V. & the 10th Me as well, had no sort of confidence in Crawford & precious little in anybody else." Gould later added, "There was, in the old brigade, an utter lack of confidence in all the high officers!! In the 28 & 46 it was only a little short of mutiny. The contempt they felt for Crawford, witness

also Fillebrown's fling at him in his report."[2] Another veteran, B. W. Morgan, who chimed in on Crawford's lack of zeal remembered it thusly:

> Crawford commanded the 1st Brigade but was not with it very much as it took most of his time to hunt trees that a minie ball could not go through and then he says he was wounded. If so, he wounded himself and went to Chambersburgh [sic] his home to have the wound dressed and took all his headquarters with him.

Brigadier General Abram Duryée

Another general officer who was criticized by veterans in their letters to Carman was Abram Duryée. Duryée was a wealthy mahogany importer in New York City, and a militia officer. He had commanded the famous 7th New York State Militia, resigning in 1859. When the war broke out, Duryée recruited the famous 5th New York Infantry, "Duryee's Zouaves" but was promoted brigadier general of volunteers in August 1862. He was wounded at Second Manassas, while commanding a brigade in Brigadier General James Ricketts' division. His brigade was the first engaged on the morning of September 17 at Antietam, fighting in the East Woods and the cornfield area. Several veterans had some disparaging things to say about his conduct at Antietam. A member of the 107th Pennsylvania Infantry remembered:

> *Duryee's Brigade was not cut to pieces*, of course they suffered a good deal, but my impression always has been that they might have made a better fight and staid to the front longer than they did, and the want of it was, when they went back they kept up no organization and Duryée saw nothing of them until the next day.
>
> I always had the greatest respect for Gen. Duryee and we were personal friends and I felt exceedingly sorry when he left the Army, but I assure you he got things a good deal mixed in his report of the battle, so far as his command was concerned. His *brother the captain*, and aide on his staff, was wounded and I never saw a more

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2 Lieutenant Colonel J. S. Fillebrown wrote the report for the 10th Maine at Antietam, found in *OR*, vol. 19, pt. 1, 488-89. His "fling" was quite tame, merely mentioning that Mansfield was the only general officer the regiment saw in the battle.

excited man and he was in this fight, riding up and down the line like a wild man.[3]

Yours truly,
H. J. Sheafer[4]

In the aftermath of their fighting several other members of the brigade made mention of Duryée. One private recalled:

> Here we fought till we were so light that we made a mere skirmish line and Gen. Duryee ordered a retreat. We were falling back in order when a mounted officer rode up just west of the timber and ordered the General to '*rally his* men and *restore* the broken line.' 'I can't do it,' said Duryee. 'There's all the men I have left.' (The latter clause spoken first.)
>
> I think I know that when Gen. Duryee said, 'there's all the men I have left,' he didn't know where the 97th and 107 were. Why? I must tell you, then after falling back from the voluntary charge, and holding the line till help came, towards the Smoketown road we came upon where General. Duryee was, dismounted and demoralized.
>
> Here we fought till our ranks wee badly cut up, too many leaving the field helping off wounded. Presently Gen. Duryea [sic] appeared on foot. 'Where have you been Gen? I was afraid you was shot" said a man or officer in rear.' 'I've been probing the wound of my horse.' said the Gen. Still, we held the line.
>
> Maj. Gould, this promise me – most of all God knows I would not mar the fame of any gallant comrade, living or dead. I had not seen the General since he manifestly made that speech concerning his force. We

3 William Bedloe Crosby Duryée was Abram's brother and served as assistant adjutant general for the brigade until discharged December 1863. There is no record of his wounding.

4 Henry J. Sheafer was from Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. In March 1862, he enlisted as captain in the 107th Pennsylvania Infantry. He served gallantly and received brevet promotions when he mustered out in 1865.

were retiring when we met him. He had to [cheer?] us and from my military bearing he doffed his hat and made a big spread, a little later scarcely out of the enemy's fire. A man of the 105th I think, offered him his canteen. 'Hold on,' said Duryee, 'and let an old soldier take a drink.' He was taking it.[5]

I am sure we commanded ourselves well, those who elected go off the field with wounded, but our old Gen., who was knocked out in the first round with his bottle, it seems demoralized me and the rest of the brigade so that we didn't meet them with the bayonet and learn their names."

Yours in F. C.& L.
F. N. Bell[6] [from a letter written Oct. 24, 1893 to Gould.]

Others in his brigade also offered somewhat damning testimony: "About a half mile farther to the rear we met Gen. Duryee alone, mounted. He asked in a tone noting deep feeling if we had seen his brigade, they were 'all cut up.' We told him 'no' and Lieutenant made a remark more sarcastic than complimentary."[7] (George Kimball[8] 12th Massachusetts Infantry, December 17, 1891)

Frederick Benewitz of the 105th New York offered these comments, "I saw General Duryea [sic] in back of a large rock and his

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5 Bell's handwriting is difficult to read. There was no Lieutenant Welsh, nor Wells, etc. in the 104th New York. Maybe it was Lieutenant Ephriam B. Wheeler, of Troy, enlisted December 1861 as 1st lieutenant Company H, 104 New York Infantry. Discharged Feb. 1863.

6 Francis N. Bell enlisted February 1862 in Geneseo as a private Company C, 104th New York Infantry, then transferred to Veteran Reserve Corps in Nov. 1863.

7 The "Lieutenant" mentioned by Kimball was likely George Washington Orne, who was wounded September 17, and died of his wounds October 10, 1862.

8 George Kimball, a printer from Boston, enlisted June 1861 as a private, Company A, 12th Massachusetts Infantry. He was promoted to corporal November 1862, wounded in action December 13, 1862, Fredericksburg, Virginia, July 1, 1863, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and mustered out July 1864. Kimball published his memoirs, *A Corporal's Story: Civil War Recollections of the Twelfth Massachusetts* in 1893.

orderly with the General's horse, and about fifty men scattered about him; men which I supposed belonged to his brigade."[9]

J. Fletcher Conrad of the 125th Pennsylvania also may have spotted Duryée in the rear:

> I wish to ask you a question affecting my own memory. I saw the 10th Maine, as I think, near the Croasdale Knoll, and there was then in their neighborhood a Brigadier General with his star on, without a horse, and that impressed me ever since. He seemed to have no duty but staying behind the knoll. I well remember his personality. He had a great hat and a man of about 40 to 50 years, thick set about 5 feet 6 or 8 and perhaps 175 pounds who was he?[10]
>
> Very truly
> J. Fletcher Conrad[11]

Duryée returned to the army after recovering from his wound. Because General Ricketts was injured at Antietam, John Gibbon was assigned to command the division. Because Duryée's commission predated Gibbon's, he protested, but was rebuffed and then resigned his commission.

10th Maine Infantry

Because Gould corresponded often with Carman, Gould shared some thoughts about the officers in his regiment, the 10th Maine.

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9 Frederick Benewitz or "Benewait" as it is spelled in records, enlisted in Attica, New York, in December 1861 as a private, Company A, 105th New York Infantry. March 1863 transferred to Company H, 94th New York Infantry. Discharge not stated.

10 Gould did not answer as to the identity of that general. The age and physical description fit Abram Duryée, who was 46 at the time, and some other writers allude to Duryée skulking. There were only nine generals in the 1st Corps and two of them were wounded and left the field. Duryée was also wounded, but evidently remained on, or near the field. The 12th Corps was more deficient, having only five generals, two of whom were wounded early in the battle.

11 John Fletcher Conrad of Huntingdon County enlisted August 1862 as a corporal, Company C, 125th Pennsylvania Infantry. Promoted hospital steward August 1862, mustered out May 1863.

> Walker had been sick for a month & was the merest non-entity for a fighting leader, though a right good fellow & a proper subject for the hospital.[12] Affairs were also very materially made worse in a little incident which was observed by us all when Williams, Knipe & Beal met under a tree (which I cannot locate) in front of the brigade, while we were all at [illegible], took a pull at the canteen which we all knew full well did not contain hot coffee.[13] There was, in the old brigade, an utter lack of confidence in all the high officers!!

Gould later added, "The result of all this is that when all got out of it, men & officer, as soon as there was a good first class excuse. The marvel is that we got in & staid in any length of time. It was individual courage that held those in the fight. Mansfield was the only man who "*inspired*" any of us & when we saw him go down, it was pretty blue times."

Williams evidently agreed, writing "The 10 Maine after making a brave but rather disorderly fight and losing ground etc. and Col. Beal had gone off, not to return to the battlefield." Gen. A. S. Williams, May 18, 1877[14]

Gould's assessment of the lack of faith in their officers is borne out by a soldier in the 46th Pennsylvania Infantry who wrote,

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12 Charles Walker of Portland served as captain 1st Maine Infantry (90-day regiment). Commissioned September. 1861 Major 10th Maine Infantry. Mustered out May 1863. Other men in the 10th Maine hinted at his lack of courage.

13 Alpheus Williams, commanding the division, and for most of the battle, the 12th Corps. He was a volunteer officer with no professional training, but quickly became a proficient and capable commander. He commanded a division through the war but was never promoted beyond Brigadier General.

James Farmer Knipe, of Mt. Joy, Pennsylvania, served in the United States Army from 1842-1846, and worked in railroading. He worked as an inspector for the brigade, and was appointed colonel of the 46th Pennsylvania Infantry in August 1861. He suffered several wounds through the war, was promoted to brigadier general, and transferred to the Army of the Cumberland. He mustered out in 1865 and served as a postmaster.

George Lafayette Beal of Norway, Maine, served in the 1st Maine (90-day regiment) as captain. He was commissioned colonel of the 10th Maine in September 1861, wounded in action on September 17, 1862 at Antietam (in both legs), and mustered out May 1863. He was commissioned colonel of the 29th Maine Infantry December 1863. He was promoted to brigadier general, and mustered out January 1866 with brevet to major general.

14 Ezra A. Carman Papers, Manuscript Division, NYPL.

I [was] still Comdg. the Co. though we had two Lieuts. reported for duty on Morning Report. They were Coffee Coolers of the First Water and should have had Charges from the U. S. and state of Pa for Cowardice of a very high order. Perhaps you have met them, they were 1st Lt John Care & 2nd Lt Sam. A. Chambers.[15] After all danger was over, they came up on the morning of the 20th and resumed duty. They were the class that could tell all about a fight. I never could tell very much, as my duty was to Load, Fire & do so again while in the 46.

Yours in F. C. & L.
M. J. Hawley[16] Jan. 24, 1892

Lieutenant Colonel James Crandall Lane, 102nd New York Infantry

One of the regiments in Stainrook's brigade (General George Greene's 2nd Division) was the 102nd New York Infantry. At Antietam it was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James Crandall Lane.[17] He evidently was unpopular in the regiment, and his valor called into question by several of the men in the regiment, as seen below.

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15 John Care, a 25-year-old distiller from Harrisburg, enlisted Sept. 1861 as corporal Company D, 46th Pennsylvania Infantry. He was promoted to sergeant October 1861, 1st lieutenant for Company I, March 1862, captain Aug. 1863. He resigned June 1864. Samuel Chambers of Allegheny County enlisted September 1861 as 1st sergeant Company F, 46th Pennsylvania Infantry. He was promoted to 2nd lieutenant Company I, March 1862, and resigned January 1863. Despite Hawley's accusations neither man was ever charged for their dereliction of duty and were never dismissed from the regiment.

16 Michael J. Hawley of Luzerne County enlisted October 1861 as 1st sergeant Company I, 46th Pennsylvania Infantry. He mustered out September 1864. Enlisted October 1864 as sergeant Company C, 107th New York Infantry. Promoted 2nd lieutenant Company D, May 1865, no muster out data.

17 He was born 1823, in New York City. Graduated school in Poultney, Vermont. He worked as an architect and civil engineer, on Illinois Central Railroad, United States Coast Survey and mineralogical surveys in Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico and Cuba. In March 1862 he was commissioned major, 102nd New York Infantry. promoted lieutenant colonel July 1862, colonel December 1862. Wounded in action July 3, 1863, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, in the arm. His regiment combined with the 78th New York, he mustered out July 1864. Postwar he continued mineralogical work in the western United States, and several New York railroads. Chief Engineer of Westchester County Parks, died December 1888.

Lewis R. Stegman[18] April 4, 1892, to John M. Gould: "The 'Lane' he spoke of was the Lieut. Col., otherwise "fighting Major" universally known among the men as Black Jack and an incubus. Fortunately, we had a fine body of line officers and good men in the ranks. While always on the field, he never gave commands. We couldn't get rid of him until '64. When his name is mentioned, it is with a damn. I preferred charges of cowardice against him at Antietam, but Geary commanded their withdrawal and I had to submit."[19]

L. B. Welton letter to Stegman: "At that time my entire interest was in our Reg't. and the work we did. I do remember very distinctly Elmore's jamming it to Lane, your contempt of B. J. who lay with his nose close under a corn hill and your provoking careless coolness. The night of the battle I fell in a dead faint while trying to go for water was kindly cared for and took my place the next morning in the ranks."[20]

Albert Bauer, 102nd New York[21] letter to Gould March 4, 1892: "I agree with you that the official reports are in the main, wrong and I long ago decided to pay no attention to them. In fact, never read them but

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18 Lewis R. Stegman enlisted New York City September. 1861 as captain. Company E, 102nd New York Infantry. Promoted to major February 1864. Wounded in Action August 9, 1862, Cedar Mountain, Virginia, July 3, 1863, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, November 27, 1863, Ringgold, Georgia, June 15, 1864, Pine Mountain, Georgia, discharged for wounds October 1864. He was active in veterans' activities and was a speaker at the dedication of the New York Monument at Antietam in 1923. He did not mention Lane in those remarks.

19 Lieutenant Colonel James C. Lane, whom many in the 102nd New York disliked intensely. The definition of "incubus" varies, but includes, demon, evil spirit, and anything oppressive. Stegman clearly didn't mean it as a compliment.

John White Geary, Mexican War veteran and former governor of Kansas Territory, commanded the 2nd brigade. He received two wounds at Cedar Mountain in August and was not present at Antietam but returned to command the brigade in late September.

20 This account came from the Gould Papers and has no signature. Gould's notes say it is from "L. B. Welton, Co. H, 102 NY." Lyman B. Welton enlisted at Lodi January 1862 as Private, Company H, 102ne New York Infantry. Promoted to corporal, no date, sergeant July 1864, wounded in action Pine Mountain, Georgia June 15, 1864, mustered out July 1865. "B.J." was a reference to Lane, "Black Jack" as he was called with disdain in the regiment.

21 Albert Bauer of New York City enlisted September 1861 as sergeant Company A, 102nd New York Infantry. Promoted 1st sergeant, no date, wounded in action June 27, 1864, Kennesaw Mountain, Georgia (severely in left leg, amputated), discharged for disability November 1864.

once, when I discovered so many errors, even in the report of Col J. C. Lane of our regiment that I pay no attention to them."

A. P. Bates[22] 102nd New York to Gould March 18, 1892: "I spoke of Captain Elmore taking command; Major or Lieut. Colonel James C. Lane was in rear of the regiment & came up while we were supporting the battery."

Colonel William H. Christian

One of the more well-known leaders who failed the test of courage at Antietam was Colonel William Henry Christian.[23]

At the outbreak of the Civil War Christian lobbied New York Governor Morgan to raise a regiment, which was granted, and he was appointed the colonel of the 26th New York Infantry. in May 1861. Christian was described as man of firm principles and his regiment soon earned a reputation for being well-drilled and proficient soldiers. He also had his officers sign a temperance pledge.

After the battle of First Manassas his regiment was sent out on a minor scouting expedition, which not only proved unsuccessful, but his men plundered and abused some Virginia civilians. Christian asked for a court of inquiry to clear his name, but it was never held.

His regiment was assigned to Major General Irvin McDowell's corps, but only saw minor infantry skirmishing up until the Battle of Second Manassas. On August 30, 1862, as part of Brigadier General Zealous B. Tower's brigade, the 26th New York was sent to hold Chinn Ridge in a futile attempt to stem Confederate Major General James Longstreet's attack on the Union left flank. As the regiment marched towards the ridge Christian was seen lying under a tree, with a blanket covering him and being attended by a physician. Post-war accounts are mixed, some men remembering the colonel had a bad cold and was hoarse on the night of the 29th, others remembering he had sunstroke. What seems to be widely agreed upon was that he seemed fine on the morning of August 30. After missing the battle, where his regiment lost 169 casualties, Christian

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22 Aaron P. Bates, enlisted October 1861 as 1st lieutenant, promoted to captain November 1862, resigned February 1863.

23 Christian was born in 1825, in Utica, New York. He was a civil engineer and surveyor, and served as a sergeant in the 1st New York Infantry in the Mexican War. His regiment was sent to San Francisco and saw no action. Christian was promoted to 1st sergeant before mustering out. He remained in California for several years, trying his hand at a number of occupations before returning to New York where he was a civil engineer in Utica. He was also active in the militia, serving as a drill master.

appeared that evening and gathered the regiment, and the brigade, together and assumed command as he was the senior colonel. Sunstroke indeed!

Christian commanded the brigade in the Maryland Campaign, as part of Rickett's division of General Joseph Hooker's 1st Corps. His brigade was lightly engaged at South Mountain, losing a total of 8 casualties, and significantly, all to musketry, no Confederate artillery was involved in their fight. Antietam would be quite a different story.

Ricketts' division was part of the first attack on the Confederate line early on the morning of September 17, 1862. Christian's brigade was sent southward out of the East Woods on the left portion of the Union attack on Trimble's and Hays' Confederate brigades. As the brigade moved out they "did an unnecessary amount of drilling under a wicked artillery fire that killed and wounded many men and demoralized one or two of the most prominent officers."[24] This was Ezra Carman's vaguely-worded description of Christian, who once again deserted his command on the very moment of battle. Carman "softened" his assessment of Christian's behavior, which the following accounts illustrate was far worse than the description above. One veteran recalled,

> Shot and bullets were flying in the air over our heads but did us no harm as they came from the high ground in our front, at this [time] no other troops were in view. We had been there a short time when Capt. Williams, of Ricketts' staff rode up to Col. Christian, in command of the brigade and immediately the Regiments were formed in column by division and moved forward to the woods.[25] I was then in Command of A Co., 9th in line, 5th division so that after entering the woods I was unable to see clearly what was in front of us. I saw no troops other than our Regt. The land was rising with ledges of rock cropping out of the ground, we had proceeded but a short distance into the woods when we halted, why I could never learn, but it

24 Ezra A. Carman, *The Maryland Campaign of September 1862,* vol. 2, edited by Thomas Clemens (Savas Beatie, 2012), 81.

25 This account is from John W. Williams, enlisted July 1861 in Philadelphia as 1st lieutenant, Company H, 29th Pennsylvania Infantry. Promoted April 1862 to captain and assistant adjutant general, United States Army of Ricketts' staff, resigned in July 1863. Colonel. William Christian of the 26th Pennsylvania Infantry was commanding the brigade.

> was only momentarily and I think it was a critical moment, for the shot & shell were tearing through the trees at a furious rate, luckily over our heads. At this moment a Genl. on horseback—I was told it was Genl. Seymour—appeared on the left flank and rear of our column and asked in a commanding tone "Why do you halt, who commands this brigade" I pointed to Col. Christian not six feet from me, the Genl. looked at him and cried "Forward Brigade."[26]

Another 26th New York veteran wrote "The battery which threw shells while we were advancing began to give us grape & although we received a sharp fire of musketry, I could not see the rebels at all, and urged a charge, but for the lack of concerted action on the part of our line officers it was not undertaken. I will digress here to say that Col Christian, who commanded the 26th, showed the "white feather" and when we received the first fire he turned and fled to the rear and almost created a stampede among some troops in the rear; (they may have been your brigade) by shouting that our flank was turned and the lines completely broken. This left us at loose ends as far as field officers were concerned as no one knew of this action of the Col. until after we had retired. Before night of that day, he had been requested by the line officers to resign and had handed in his resignation. Which was promptly accepted (and he went home in disgrace)."[27]

William H. Holstead[28] of the 26th New York sent this memoir to Gould on March 9, 1893:

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26 General Truman Seymour commanded the brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves that held the upper East Woods overnight on the 16th, and Christian's brigade advanced to his support in the morning. The writer was Enoch Jones, Company A, 26th New York Infantry to John M. Gould, February 28, 1893. He enlisted June 1861 in Utica as a private. He was promoted 1st sergeant August 1861, 2nd lieutenant November 1861, 1st lieutenant August 1862. Mustered out August 1863.

27 William P. Gifford to John M. Gould March 7, 1893. William P. Gifford enlisted in Utica, May 1861, as sergeant, Company I, 26th New York Infantry, promoted 2nd lieutenant January 1862, 1st lieutenant February 1863. Mustered out June 1863. Later service in 22nd New York Heavy Artillery as lieutenant and captain. His letter was dated March 7, 1893, from Jamestown, New York.

28 William Henry Holstead enlisted in Utica, New York, in May 1861 as sergeant in Company C, 26th New York Infantry, promoted 1st sergeant September 1861, 2nd lieutenant November 1861, wounded in action December 13, 1862, Fredericksburg, Virginia, mustered out May 1863.

"There was one little incident that occurred soon after our getting into line on the morning and moving towards the woods but while we were still in the open field. An orderly came to our Col. (Christian) who at that time was nearly in the rear of our Regt. About ten rods and I think it must have been for the purpose of having him report or attend to something further to the right or west. A soldier of the Mexican War and a man of many noble qualities he was, he could not stand shells and there in the open ground in sight of all our Regt and some others he dismounted from his horse and started leading his horse and as the shells burst over our heads and around us, (and I thought they were quite plenty). He would duck or dodge his head and go crouching along. He soon resigned. I think largely on account of this."

John D. Vautier, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania[29] authored the regimental history, *History of the 88th Pennsylvania Volunteers in the War for the Union, 1861-1865*, in 1894. In a letter to Gould dated December 5, 1892 he stated, "Yours Rec'd. Col. Christian of the 26th N.Y. ranked, and took command of Tower's brigade, after Tower was wounded at Bull Run.[30] He took the brigade in, in good shape, but when the fire got very hot, he "*walked Spanish*,"[31] cut and ran, an example that fortunately was not followed by his brigade.

This was the rumor among the men, the rank and file, after the battle, and in their own way the men mostly found out everything. This was fully

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29 John Dominique Vautier, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Enlisted September 1861 as a private, Company I, 88th Pennsylvania Infantry, wounded in action at Cold Harbor, Virginia, June 2, 1864, in the hand. Mustered out September 1864.

30 William Henry Christian served as a sergeant in the 7th New York during the Mexican War. He enlisted May 1861 as colonel of the 26th New York Infantry. He led his regiment at Second Manassas and a brigade in the Maryland Campaign, but both times when going into action deserted his brigade. Upon insistence of his regimental officers, he resigned September 19, 1862, and was promoted brevet brigadier general on March 31, 1865.

Zealous Bates Tower, a United States Army Engineer since the Mexican War, was appointed brigadier general of volunteers June 1862. He led a brigade in Ricketts' division, was severely wounded in action at Second Bull Run which ended his active service in the war.

31 "Walked Spanish" was an antiquated term for being forced to leave a place.

and publicly confirmed in the "History of the 26 N. Y." published after they went home (they were a two-year regiment) in which the subject was sorrowfully but emphatically considered.[32]

Another source stated that Brigadier General Truman Seymour, commanding a brigade in the Pennsylvania Reserves Division, found Christian "cowering behind a tree." He relieved Christian on the spot and that night General Ricketts, although injured from his horse falling on him, informed Christian that if he did not immediately resign, he would be recommended for court martial and charged with cowardice. The next day Christian's letter of resignation cited "Business of importance requires my presence with my family and numbers of the regiment being reduced to less than two hundred men, and it having able officers, I therefore ask that I may be permitted to resign from the service and ask that I be honorably discharged there from."[33]

Despite his abysmal record as a combat leader, on March 31, 1865, Christian was promoted brevet brigadier general. According to his wife, he made several trips to Washington, DC, trying to return to the army, despite his letter of resignation. In 1884 he applied for a pension, citing sunstroke at Second Bull Run. His claim was denied, and he died of "insanity" in an asylum, May 8, 1887, Utica, New York.

Another soldier of his regiment remembered,

> Col. Christian of the 26th N. Y. was with Col. Lyle and others riding at the head of the column. It was then I heard Christian say that he had "a great horror of these shell" and shortly after he passed to the rear. I think that his defection dated from that time and was subsequently the cause of his getting out of the Army.
>
> April 22, 1893
> Very respectfully yours, etc.

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32 Vautier may be referring to *A sketch of the Campaign in Virginia and Maryland, from Cedar Mountain to Antietam, by a soldier of the 26th N.Y.* (Syracuse, NY: Master & Lee, 1862), which seems to be the only contemporary regimental history. This source mentions Christian's absence at Second Manassas in vague terms, and states they fought at South Mountain under command of their lieutenant colonel. This pamphlet does not mention Christian's name in the portion devoted to Antietam.

33 Paul Taylor, *Glory Was Not Their Companion, the Twenty-Sixth New York Volunteer Infantry in the Civil War* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2005), 84.

Geo. W. Watson[34]

Lieutenant Alexander Hooe, 6th Wisconsin Infantry

Edward S. Bragg,[35] 6th Wisconsin Infantry wrote to Carman on December 26, 1894:

> The report of the battle made by me has in it as published, a paragraph graced (Sic). I will explain the "*Sic*." [Bragg was referring to his report of the battle of Antietam as printed in *Official Records*, vol. 19, pt. 1, 255, where he wrote that Company C was deployed as skirmishers, and he noticed they were not advancing as ordered.] "What I referred to may be understood when I say, the Captain commanding the skirmishers [actually Lt. Alexander Hooe] on the right showed the white feather that morning, dodged behind a tree and grew there, letting his line go helter-skelter without direction, which resulted in an oblique movement of the Regiment to the right in following its skirmish line.[36]

Colonel William Marsh Searing, 30th New York Infantry

Colonel William Marsh Searing commanded the 30th New York Infantry in the New York Iron Brigade, which had suffered severely in the battles of Second Manassas and South Mountain. A soldier in the 30th New York Infantry wrote to Gould on October 4, 1893:

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34 George W. Watson enlisted November 1861 as 1st lieutenant Company H, 90th Pennsylvania Infantry, promoted to captain September 1862, (not mustered at that rank). Wounded in action and prisoner of war on May 5, 1864, Wilderness, Virginia (severely in right leg, amputated). Discharged for wounds November 1864.

35 Edward Stuyvesant Bragg of Fond du Lac, Wisconsin enlisted May 1861 as captain Company E, 6th Wisconsin Infantry, promoted to major September 1861, lieutenant colonel June 1862, colonel March 1863, brigadier general June 1864. Wounded in action September 17, 1862, Antietam, Maryland, mustered out October 1865.

36 The phrase "showed the white feather" was an expression for cowardice. The captain was Alexander S. Hooe of Prairie du Chien, who enlisted April 1861, and promoted captain Company C that same month. He was discharged February 1863. His father had distinguished service in the United States Regular Army in the Mexican War, but evidently this was not the first time the younger Hooe "froze" in combat; see Lance J. Herdegen, *The Men Stood like Iron: How the Iron Brigade Won Its Name* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), 248 n. 7.

Yours of the 29th rc'd. Our Regt. went into the fight with three comps. I have met only one so far who says he was in the fight. I think he was there, but not in it, for I could get no information from [him], only that they crossed over the creek the night before. The excuse was so long ago, don't recall it.

And obliged, Fraternally,
John D. Dargan[37]
Col. Wm. M. Searing & J. N. Andrews[38] was not in the fight, that I know.
Yours. D.

Searing wrote a letter to Carman in April 1905 acknowledging the receipt of the Map Atlas Carman had produced and was circulating to veterans for comment. Searing simply stated he would show it to the veterans of the 30th at their next reunion and offered no information about the battle. This seems to confirm that he didn't know what happened because he wasn't in the battle on September 17, 1862.

When Colonel Walter Phelps, commanding the brigade, ordered Searing to lead his regiment on September 17 at Antietam, Searing refused. Court martial charges were drawn up by Colonel Phelps for his dismissal, but there was never a trial, and he mustered out with the regiment in June 1863. It is possible Phelps used the charges as a threat. In the charges Phelps quoted Searing as saying, "I have already lost one horse and I am not going to risk my life to lead 50 men in battle, or words to that effect." After the war Searing applied for a pension due to "illness" but was denied, suggesting his behavior was widely known.[39]

Brigadier General John C. Caldwell

Brigadier General John C. Caldwell, an educator and loyal Republican, entered the army as a colonel of the 11th Maine Infantry. By

37 John D. Dargan enlisted in Lansingburg, New York as a private Company A, 30th New York Infantry. He was promoted sergeant March 1862, and quartermaster sergeant August 1862. Mustered out May 1863.

38 Lieutenant James N. Andrews, Jr. mustered out with his regiment and received a pension, so if he shirked his duty, he was not punished for it. Bryson said he was left at South Mountain, and that most likely is correct.

39 These court martial papers are in Phelps' papers at the United States Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle Pennsylvania.

the wounding of Brigadier General O. O. Howard, Caldwell rose to command a brigade in the 1st Division, 2nd Corps. His brigade was ordered to advance against the Sunken Road (later known as Bloody Lane) to support Brigadier General Thomas Meagher's Irish Brigade and if possible, flank the defenders in the lane. Caldwell delayed advancing until being peremptorily ordered to do so. Even then Caldwell personally seemed to lag behind. Several accounts relate that Caldwell could not be found in the fighting line, and a subordinate sent to find him returned without any success. It is clear that neither Colonel Cross of the 5th New Hampshire Infantry who served under Caldwell, nor General Richardson had any respect for him,

Colonel Cross remembered Richardson asking him where General Caldwell was, and replied "in the rear." A soldier called out, "He's behind the hay stacks!" Richardson called for Caldwell to come forward and command his brigade, without any response or success.[40] Yet Carman's only hint of criticism was stating that "Cols. Barlow and Miles impatiently strode along the line making the air blue, cursing the fate or want of generalship that compelled slow and halting movements where dash was required."[41] While not named, it is clear Carman was referring to Caldwell.

When his conduct at Antietam was questioned Caldwell demanded a Court of Inquiry to clear his name. The testimony of the surgeon of the 64th New York Infantry mentioned that Caldwell was "some 30 rods in the rear of me, sheltered from the line by a ledge of rocks, from that point I knew he could not observe his brigade." The surgeon's testimony was discounted since he was not a combatant, and Caldwell was cleared.[42]

Another important clue is that after Richardson was wounded and Meagher was injured, McClellan sent General W. S. Hancock to take command of the division, of which Caldwell was the senior officer on site. Yet, oddly enough, Caldwell performed well in command of a division at Gettysburg in 1863 and had a successful career in various endeavors afterward.

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40 Cross's account is from his letters, compiled in Holden, Walter, William E. Ross and Elizabeth Slomba, eds. *Stand Firm and Fire Low, The Civil War Writings of Colonel Edward Cross* (Hanover, NH: University of New Hampshire, 2002), 48.

41 Carman, *The Maryland Campaign*, 279.

42 Surgeon George Barr, 64th New York Infantry letters to his wife, December 23, 1862, Schoff Civil War Collection, Clements Library, University of Michigan.

Confederate Leaders

Readers will notice there are far more Union accounts than Confederate. There are several reasons why this is the case. Firstly, there were fewer Confederates in the battle, and fewer of them, percentage-wise, survived it. Thus, there are far fewer letters from Confederates than Union soldiers. Secondly, the Union soldiers made far more attacks in the battle than Confederates did, and the leadership necessary for an attack is greater than holding a position. Another factor was that the Union army had many un-tried troops in their ranks. General Robert E. Lee's army at Sharpsburg was comprised almost exclusively of veteran soldiers who were thus less likely to shirk their duty. Lastly, even after 30 years, some Confederates were reluctant to share anything disparaging about their fellow soldiers' lack of valor, especially with a former Union officer. Nevertheless, some examples exist to show that lack of valor was seen in both armies at Antietam.

Brigadier General John R. Jones

John R. Jones, a Virginia Military Institute graduate, became lieutenant colonel of the 33rd Virginia Infantry in the "Stonewall" Brigade in 1861. Complimented by Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson for his actions in the Valley Campaign of 1862, he was promoted to brigadier general and in command of a brigade of Jackson's division. He was wounded by a shell fragment at White Oak Swamp in the Seven Days fighting and contracted typhoid fever, delaying his recovery until September 1862. At Frederick he assumed command of the division, and led it through the surrender at Harpers Ferry. His division arrived at Sharpsburg and was positioned along the Hagerstown Pike on the night of September 16. He described what happened the next morning, in his report, "[i]t was during this almost unprecedented iron storm that a shell exploded a little above my head, and so stunned and injured me that I was rendered unfit for duty, and retired from the field, turning over command to Brigadier General Starke..."[43]

In an undated letter to John Worsham of Richmond, Virginia[44] one soldier remembered:

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43 *OR*, vol. 19, pt. 1, 1008.

44 John Henry Worsham enlisted April 1861 at Richmond, as private, Company F, 21st Virginia Infantry. Promoted 2nd sergeant April 1863, 1st sergeant December 1863. Wounded in action September 19, 1864, Winchester, Virginia, left leg and disabled. In 1912, he published his memoirs, *One of Jackson's Foot Cavalry*.

A terrible artillery fire preceded the attack of the enemy on the morning of the 17th, and during this fire Gen. Jones having been injured by the bursting of a shell near at hand, left the field and ordered me to inform Gen. Starke that he had done so. The charge made by our brigades immediately after I communicated to Gen. Starke the information of Gen. Jones withdrawal from the command of the division, was made as a counter to the enemy's attack and my impression is that the Federals were beaten back. I don't seem to remember anything which transpired after this charge except that I was sent off to look for Gen. Early who was supposed to be somewhere in near proximity to our left.

I remain,
Yours truly,
Thos. R. Dunn[45]"

1st Lieut., Co. D, Acting Adjutant General, Stonewall Division, on the occasion of the battle of Sharpsburg; afterwards Capt. Co. A, 1st Va. Battalion of infantry.

Jones himself, writing to Carman on February 25, 1896, summarized his activities in the campaign:

Returning to the Army after a long spell of sickness - typhoid fever - as senior Brigadier I took command of Jackson's Division at Frederick City where I found it. My Brigade was the Second of that Division. I commanded it at the capture of Harpers Ferry. Gen. Starke was the only other Brigadier with the division. We left Harpers Ferry

45 Thomas Robert Dunn of Chesterfield County enlisted November 1861 as 2nd lieutenant and adjutant general 1st Virginia Battalion Infantry, transferred as 2nd lieutenant Company D, March 1862, 1st lieutenant August 1862, captain, Company A, July 1863. Assigned August 1862, to J. R. Jones' brigade (as acting adjutant general), commanding company October 1862, detailed January 1863 (to collect absentees), commanding company March 1863. Surrendered April 9, 1865, Appomattox Court House, Virginia.

about 11:00 PM marched all night and waded the Potomac at Shepherdstown, the head of the column reaching the river just at sunrise Tuesday morning. After crossing everything safely I moved toward the battlefield leaving Sharpsburg to my right, I did not keep the road but moved through fields, and struck the Hagerstown Turnpike a few hundred yards South of the Dunkard Stone Church. The left of our line, Hood, rested on the Turnpike. My orders were to extend the line from Hood's left. I moved some distance beyond the Church at the edge of the Church woods headed my column to the left my right resting on the Turnpike.

After a little skirmishing the men lay on their arms until the dawn of the day, when work commenced, hot work. Early in the actions I was injured by a shell and was carried from the field, turned over my command to Genl. Starke, who was killed shortly thereafter.

Very respectfully,
John R Jones[46]

John Worsham wrote to Carman May 6, 1895:

Jackson's old division was commanded by Brig. Gen. J. R. Jones, when it reached Sharpsburg on the 16th. He was disabled early in the action of the 17th, and was succeeded by Brigadier-General Starke, who was killed about one-half an hour after, when he was succeeded by Col. A. J. Grigsby.

Near Stony Point, May 7th, 1895
E. A. Carman, Esq.[47]

A bit more accurate, although charitable, description came from the colonel of the 27th Virginia Infantry who commanded the division by the end of the battle, who wrote to Carman May 7, 1895:

46 John R. Jones to Carman, Ezra Carman Papers, NYPL.
47 John Worsham, 21st Virginia Infantry to Carman, Antietam Studies, Box 2, NARA.

> On that morning Jones, who was in command of the Division, left the field.
>
> Very respectfully,
> A.J. Grigsby[48]

Other sources in the division recall Jones being "stunned by the concussion of a shell." This event may have happened exactly as these men described it, but J. R. Jones' pattern of behavior in various battles suggests something more troubling. Three months later at the battle of Fredericksburg, Jones hid behind a tree rather than lead his brigade into the battle. Another commander accused him of cowardice, and court martial charges were preferred, but he was acquitted. In the next battle, Chancellorsville, in May 1863, as the fighting began Jones went to the rear "due to an ulcerated condition of one of his legs." Shortly after that he resigned his commission.

Oddly enough he evidently followed Lee's army to Gettysburg, in civilian clothing, for what reason, we do not know. He was captured near Smithsburg, Maryland, on July 4, 1863, and despite his civilian status was imprisoned for the remainder of the war.

After the war Jones further distanced himself from other former Confederate generals by not only fathering two children by his black housekeeper, and two more after his wife divorced him, but he claimed them as his children, raised them as members of his family, and paid for their education. In the reconstruction-era South, this was not acceptable to southern social norms.[49]

Brigadier General Roswell Ripley

Another southern leader found wanting was General Roswell Ripley, commanding a brigade in D. H. Hill's division.[50] Hill and two of his

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48 Andrew Jackson Grigsby of Rockbridge Company, Mexican War veteran, Commissioned June 1861 as major 27th Virginia Infantry, promoted lieutenant colonel October 1861, colonel May 1862, wounded in action July 1, 1862, Malvern Hill, Virginia. Resigned November 19, 1862, because he was not promoted to brigadier general.

49 Ezra Warner, *Generals in Gray* (Baton Rouge, LA: LSU Press, 1959), 165; Carrie Allen McCray, *Freedom's Child: The Life of a Confederate General's Black Daughter* (New York: Workman Publishing, 1998).

50 Roswell Ripley, a United States Military Academy graduate was born in Ohio but lived in South Carolina before the war. He commanded a brigade in D. H. Hill's

colonels carried on a correspondence about Ripley in the post-war era. Below are some excerpts:

Colonel S. D. Thruston to Colonel William DeRossett, June 18, 1886: "...it was at this fence Ripley was so seriously hit in the cravat."

Also from Thruston, written on July 12, 1886: "I sent Capt. Ben. Reid [Read], of Ripley's staff, to tell Ripley I wanted to see him, and where I told him that the men in the ranks were talking freely of his cowardice in that he had never been under infantry fire with his command. The hill rose gradually as we approached the Mumma house, passing which there was a corn field to our right and rear, extending to the fence where Ripley was "hurt in the cravat." [51]

William DeRossett to D. H. Hill June 18,1885,

> The first shell fired on Wednesday fell in my regiment and wounded 16 officers and men. When we advanced that morning Ripley was *with me*. After four messages sent him he came down and asked me what I wanted. I spoke *plainly* and told him that in all the engagements I had been in, I felt the need of advice from my commander and had never seen him; further, that the rank and file were complaining that they had not seen their Brigadier under infantry fire since he took command, and that they believed he kept to the rear to avoid the fire. He blusteringly replied that he "would show them he was no coward and would go along with me into action." After advancing some 2 or 300 yards we were halted at a worm fence and while there standing he received a slight wound in the throat and was carried to the rear a short distance and recovering from the shock, took care of himself, and the last I saw of him was breaking down the corn (standing in a field) going to the rear. He redeemed himself in the estimation of the command and, I learn, later in the day

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division which included the 3rd North Carolina Infantry. William DeRossett and Stephen D. Thruston were both field officers in that regiment.

51 Thruston was a physician before the war, was promoted from captain to colonel and was wounded six times during the war, being permanently disabled in April 1865. Antietam Studies, Box 2, NARA.

resumed his duties. I have no doubt his reputation was honestly earned; Let me add.[52]

Macon, Ga., June 22nd 1885.
Col. W. L. DeRosset,

Dear Sir:
I have read both of your letters with deep interest. They are full of important information. In regard to Ripley. I had feared that he was either a coward or a traitor, you know that he was a Yankee by birth. I learned that while he was on the coast of South Carolina, he was more than once denounced to his face as a coward. He left there in bad odor. But I knew nothing of this at the time, but his keeping the brigade out of the fight at Gaines' Mill and South Mountain convinced me that he would not do. Had I known his character at South Mountain, I would have put his brigade on the left where it could be seen. Thus the day might have been saved. He could hide himself finely on the right. He sent me a note, possibly an hour after he had left me saying that he "was getting along finely" so he was, out of the way of bullets. I will always be glad to hear from you and will be thankful for incidents and anecdotes of the war. Excuse the brief note. I have a great deal of work on hand.

Yours Truly,
D. H. Hill[53]

Milledgeville, Ga., June 12th 1886
Col. S. D. Thruston

My dear Sir.
Col. DeRosset wrote to me last summer that "Ripley was a born coward." He had not character before he came on

52 DeRossett entered the war as major 3rd North Carolina Infantry. He was promoted lieutenant colonel and colonel. He was wounded severely at Sharpsburg. He served in the Invalid Corps the rest of the war.
53 Ezra A. Carman Papers, Manuscript Division, NYPL.

to Virginia from Charleston. I heard Genl. Trapier[54] say of him that he was "a bully, a coward and a whoremaster." It might have been better in me to have stated plainly why the brigade did nothing at Boonsboro; but it never once occurred to me that my language would be misunderstood. The Editor of the *Century*, C. C. Buel,[55] with whom I correspond, understood me to reflect *solely* upon Ripley. He will probably come back upon me in the *Century*, and then I will expose him fully and relieve his command of any supposed blame. I had great contempt for him, but ought not to have made any public display of my feelings. I am very thankful to you for the facts that you have given.

Yours truly, in Confederate bonds,
D. H. Hill[56]

Walter Clark, Associate Justice
Raleigh, N. C., 3 Jan. 1900

Gen. E. A. Carman
Another time I was sent to pilot Armistead's Brigade in, which was sent to re-inforce us. I met him on foot, sword drawn, leading his brigade, near the barn. I saluted, told him why I was there, he answered gruffly I thought & I stepped a little to his left. As I did so a terrific discharge burst over us, and the "windage" of large shot or a shell pitched the General forward on his face. I thought he was killed. Three or four rushed to pick him up and as I was looking to see his condition his Brigade melted, not into

54 James Heyward Trapier of Georgetown, South Carolina, West Point Class of 1838, engineers, resigned 1848. Served in Charleston Harbor, 1861, promoted to brigadier general October 1861, commanded a district in Florida, and a division in Bragg's army. He was not well regarded and soon relegated to minor posts. Evidently, he knew both Hill and Ripley.

55 Clarence Clough Buel of New York. He was too young to serve in the war but was an editor of *Century Magazine* for over 40 years. He was co-editor of the *Battles & Leaders*.

56 John M. Gould Papers, Rauner Special Collections Library, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire.

tears, but into the distance, disappeared like the clansmen of Roderick Dhu, or as the great Roman said of Catiline, *abrupit, evasit, abscondit*.[57]

Still more Confederate letters to Carman hint at other officers who failed to do their duty as leaders that day:

Capt. John R. Johnson to Carman
Oct. 10, 1899
Captain Brown of a Maryland battery who was in command of our battalion in the absence of Major A. R. Courtney, afterwards ordered me to the rear to find water for the horses which were suffering greatly.[58]

Alfred Ransom Courtney enlisted July 1861 Capt. Henrico Co. Art. Promoted. July 1862 Maj.& Chief of Art. Ewell's division. He was court martialed for dereliction of duty, (due to his absence at Sharpsburg), and left Lee's army. He was appointed Ass't. Inspector General in April 1863, as part of Gen. S. B. Buckner's command.

J. Catlett Gibson[59] of the 49th Virginia wrote to Carman on November 6, 1897:

One man of my Regt was here killed by a solid shot – we could see them falling down the hill. This scared one of my lieutenants who starting of[f] the field saying he had

57 Roderick Dhu was a mythical character in Sir Walter Scott's poem "Lady of the Lake." He was an outlaw, leading Highland clans against King James V. Scott's works were popular with southerners in the nineteenth century, as Clark's reference shows. The "great Roman" was Cicero, who denounced Catiline, an overly ambitious Senator. Clark's handwriting is difficult to read, but he quoted a Latin phrase of urging someone to depart hastily. Antietam Studies, Box 2, NARA. Walter Clark served in the 35th North Carolina Infantry at Sharpsburg, and later compiled *North Carolina Regiments.*
58 John R. Johnson commanded the Bedford (Virginia) Artillery at Sharpsburg and was a lawyer after the war. William Dawson Brown of Baltimore enlisted January 1862 as lieutenant in the Chesapeake Artillery, was promoted to captain June 1862 & commanded the battery in Ewell's division.
59 Gibson was the lieutenant colonel of the 49th Virginia Infantry in Early's brigade at Sharpsburg. He was wounded 11 times during the war. Ezra A. Carman Papers, Manuscript Division, NYPL.

been wounded in the [missing word] by a cannon ball, I examined him and found he was a fraud.

Conclusion

From these examples, it should be clear there were numerous people on both sides who shirked their duties on America's bloodiest day. Some, like General Samuel Crawford, or General John Caldwell went on to prove themselves worthy in later battles. Others, such as Colonel William Christian, were able to resign before facing the consequences of their dereliction of duty. Those who were punished, such as General John R. Jones, were few compared to those who were able to avoid it, but the social stigma was certainly a problem as most regiments were recruited in a small area and becoming a social pariah was strong possibility. This was certainly the case with Jones, and probably many others. In fact, for a commissioned officer convicted of cowardice, in addition to the punishment handed down at sentencing, "that the crime, name, and place of abode and punishment of the delinquent be published in newspapers, after which it shall be scandalous for an officer to associate with him."[60]

So why did Ezra Carman use these vague phrases to describe those who failed to do their duty, or ignore these accounts altogether? I do not have an answer, and he did not say anything about it in his diary, or his post-war correspondence. Thus, I can only speculate.

In his diary Carman wrote that he participated in 23 battles during the war. He was wounded during the Peninsula Campaign, was thrown from his horse at Antietam, went home sick right after Gettysburg, and was transferred to the Western Theater with the 20th Corps. He fought in all the battles of the campaign to Atlanta, as well as the battles around it, was deafened in one ear by the explosion of a shell at the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and made the March to the Sea with Sherman, and participated in the capture of Savannah. He saw a lot of the war, and certainly witnessed the good and bad of soldiering. His manuscript of the Maryland Campaign was technically a government document, so perhaps he decided acts of cowardice did not belong in the narrative.

Maybe his war-time experiences prompted Carman to gloss over the failing of others as he realized that even the most hardened warrior has a

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60 H. L. Scott, *Military Dictionary: comprising technical definitions; information on raising and keeping troops; actual service, including makeshifts and improved matériel; and law, government, regulation, and administration relating to land forces* (New York, NY: D. Van Nostrand, 1864), 212.

breaking point. Certainly, every soldier of his experience in combat must have witnessed less than valorous behaviors in others, and perhaps resisted judgement "lest he himself be judged."

Of course, most of these men were dead by the time Carman was writing, and he may simply have wanted to avoid "speaking ill of the dead" out of respect for their families. I do not have an answer, but there is no doubt that Carman was aware of those who did not perform their full duty in battle, and who did.

Telling the Story on the Ground: Self-Guided Touring and the Antietam Visitor

by Wilson H. Beebe, Jr.

As though marking the front of some imposing federal edifice, the cover of the first ever visitor's guide to the Antietam battlefield was designed as an 8 by 10½ inch faux brass tablet, the plaque effect being secured by the illustration of slotted screw heads in each of the four corners of the page.

Aside from this effort on the cover there is no visual complexity: no photographs, no color, no graphic separators, no copy blocks, no headlines, no columns. That its production was limited to the technology of the stencil, typewriter and mimeograph is a reminder that the effort was significantly localized and *ad hoc*. American Civil War battlefield sites had only within the last two years (1933) been moved from the War Department to the National Park Service. This guide then is to be seen as among the first fruits of the battlefield's transfer, a modest effort to provide a resource to make Antietam more accessible to the casual visitor.

Looking back from today's standardized and stylized park service guides is to appreciate just how much this small production depended on the initiative and editorial discretion of Park Superintendent John K. Beckenbaugh and National Cemetery Superintendent Carl M. Taute, the former writing the text and the latter preparing the maps, both of them being guided by the baseline work products of a short lived but fruitful research project of the Civil Works Administration (CWA).[1]

Stapled between the ideology of the government's soundness on the cover (this was, after all, the Great Depression), and its message of citizen ownership and inclusiveness on the rear ("These parks belong to you and your children. See the beauty and glory of your own country first."), were five typed pages telling the story of Antietam. Reproduced on cheap construction paper, what it wants in art and presentation it makes up for in brevity and clarity.

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1 Edward Steere, Assistant Historical Technician, memorandum to Superintendent, Gettysburg, NMP, October 2, 1941, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 79, Box 2602, File 207, Washington, DC, quoted in Snell and Brown, *Administrative History*, 186-87, with more background on the Civil Works Administration at 151-55.



The 1935 Antietam Battlefield Guide cover. (Antietam National Battlefield [ANB] Library)

The first page lists the ten "high spots" of the battle, the National Cemetery, and the Philadelphia Brigade Park, the area then suggested for picnics. A hand drawn area map shows the battlefield in context, bounded between the Potomac on the west, South Mountain to the east, and Harpers Ferry to the south. The second, larger scale map, also hand drawn, is of the battlefield itself, although it lacks any indication of battle lines or troop locations, arrows of movement or other symbols of battle action. On these points it is perfectly mute, relying on the two-page, double spaced narrative that follows to tell the story.

Superintendent Beckenbaugh reported it as having "worked very satisfactorily" as a "self-guiding system." "Eight signs have been placed along the road directing the visitors to the Park Office where these



The battlefield map in the 1935 Antietam Battlefield Guide. (ANB Library)

pamphlets and information may be obtained." (The "Park Office" then being the 1867 cemetery superintendent's lodge).[2]

Until the transfer of the battlefield to the Park Service, interpretive services for the touring public were limited to the multitudinous and text rich cast iron markers of the Antietam Board. Being largely without context they are of limited value to anyone arriving on the scene without prior knowledge of the battlefield and the battle. As the role of Antietam as a military classroom was displaced by the park as tourist attraction there was a growing imperative to provide interpretive accessibility

2 Superintendent's Annual Reports for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1935 and June 30, 1936, quoted in Snell and Brown, *Administrative History*, 187.

without requiring visitors to be tactical military experts. At the same time, the Park Service had to avoid turning this place and others like it into mere playgrounds, an apprehension voiced in the Congressional hearings that explored the cession of the military parks to the Department of the Interior.[3]

It was to that end of improving visitor comprehension that Associate Historian T. Sutton Jett recommended in 1938 the placement of four outdoor maps based on the Carman/Cope Atlas at key sites throughout the field. These were to be used in conjunction with a revised self-guiding visitor brochure as was already being done at Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania, Stones River and Richmond. Proposing a "You Are Here" format, Jett had a clear understanding that what was wanted was "simplicity." While the paucity of federally controlled land was an obstacle to Jett's original plan, a change in the four proposed locations appeared to cure the problem. Nevertheless, by 1941, no progress had been made.[4]

In the meantime, Gettysburg Assistant Historical Technician Frederick Tilberg prepared and submitted the text in November 1940 for a 16-page booklet that was published in 1941 by the Superintendent of Documents and sold for 10 cents a copy. This booklet remained in print during the 1940s and 1950s.[5] Its extended treatment of the battle, of the site and the historical context in which it occurred, was a format that was used for many of the military parks at this time.[6]

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3 Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventieth Congress, Second Session on S.4173 – Transfer of National Military Parks, January 31, 1929, Washington, DC, 3-13, cited in Snell and Brown, *Administrative History*, 141.

4 Associate Historian T. Sutton Jett, Recommendations for Additional Interpretive Facilities on the Antietam Battlefield, May 1938, Washington, D.C., R.G 79, Box 2602, File 207, National Archives and Records Administration, cited in Snell and Brown, *Administrative History*, 196-99. See also National Park Service History Electronic Library and Archive, http://npshistory.com/. The 1941 Stones River guide map had specifically numbered sites, while the 1941 Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania guide had the stations marked on the guide map by unlabeled black stars. Any future references to the visitor guides and brochures for other parks will be based on this source unless specified otherwise.

5 Assistant Historical Technician Edward Steere, memorandum to Superintendent, Gettysburg NMP, October 2, 1941, RG 79, File 207, Item B-5, National Archives and Records Administration, quoted in Snell and Brown, *Administrative History*, 189.

6 See for example similar formatted guides from 1940/1941 for Gettysburg, Chickamauga, Manassas, Petersburg, and Shiloh.

The map used in the 1941 16-page booklet prepared by Frederick Tilberg that sold for 10 cents a copy (npshistory.com); and used also in the 1940 six-panel visitor guide (ANB Library).

The map used in the Tilberg piece had first been introduced in 1940 when the Park Service published its second, self-touring guide (available free to visitors), a version that was to remain in production through various editions until the mid-1960s. Produced in black and white on thin glossy stock, it comprised three, side-by-side 6 by 8-inch panels, the two outside panels closing over the center. While displaying an improvement in production qualities over the 1935 brochure, including a better cartographic effort on the map and photographs of the site, its body copy was yet made from camera ready typewriter text, painstakingly right justified, perhaps produced as an interim work product while waiting on the production of the typeset version released two years later. As an

interpretive product the 1940 brochure didn't contribute much as a guide to the battlefield. Although it did a superior job to its 1935 predecessor in giving strategic context to the battle and by describing the consequences of the Confederate loss, including both the British decision not to interfere in the American Civil War and Lincoln's use of the battle as the rationale for the issuance of the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, it accomplished little by way of assisting the visitor endeavoring to understand how the battle proper unfolded across the battlefield.

Given that there were clearly efforts within the Park Service at this time to key information stations to battlefield park touring maps, it's interesting that the obvious solution for Antietam -- keying the "high spots" from the 1935 brochure to the 1940 map, and correlating these to wayside stations on the field – eluded those who were working on the challenges of "telling the story on the ground." The possibility that a visitor guide could function as more than simply a narrative container had yet to be fully appreciated. Perhaps the interpretive efforts were stymied by the difficulty in finding that middle ground between a complex narrative, as manifest in the Antietam Board's authoritative explanatory tablets, and a simplification that would work for visitors.

The assignment of Edward Steere as the park's first full time historian in September 1941 engendered another effort at developing and implementing an overall interpretive plan, specifically including the preparation "of a tour map and interpretive plan for the battlefield ... with particular emphasis on plans for a self-guiding tour."[7] This started with a reissue of the now typeset version of the 1940 park guide in April 1942 that came equipped with a new map which illustrated the battle action with very elementary markings of the three main assault phases and the location of the opening and closing Confederate and Union lines. By illustrating troop movements in this manner, and associating them with "captions giving the gist of the story," Steere thought he could address the basic lack of knowledge confronting the visitor to Antietam. Life magazine, he noted, had done so with "considerable success" as it sought to explain the European war.[8]

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7 Memorandum on Interpretive Development Conference, September 1, 1941, RG 79, Box 2601, quoted in Snell and Brown, *Administrative History*, 203.

8 Edward Steere, Assistant Historical Technician, monthly report, April 1942, RG 79, Box 2602, File 207, National Archives, quoted in Snell and Brown, *Administrative History*, 206.



The map in the 1942 Antietam Battlefield Guide.
(ANB Library)

Steere sought to enhance this innovation by specifying on the map an explicit tour route to be followed by the visitor, with start and finish points, and with intermediate arrows along the path of what was to become increasingly formalized as the automobile tour route. No specific path had ever been previously prescribed on the access roads that had been laid by the Antietam Board 50 years prior.

Beyond the "big three" -- the Cornfield, Bloody Lane, and Burnside Bridge – which corresponded to the main assaults numbered one through three on the tour map, there was no further correlation between the tour map and battle events on the ground, even though Steere recognized the need.

Subsequently, Steere developed a plan for eight large maps employing the "blitzkrieg" style of illustration using large sweeping

arrows, to be placed in "semi-horizontal map-marker exhibits along the tour route, developing the battle operations in chronological sequence." Three of the eight proposed maps were set in place as an experiment; five more full scale sketches were completed but not erected before Steere was separated from service in the spring of 1943. There the project ended with no record as to the final disposition of the three "experiments."[9]

An effort at developing a ground marking system similar to Steere's was undertaken yet again in 1948 with "five trail-side exhibits" being in a state of preparation in June of that year. Battlefield and Cemetery Custodian Paul H. Younger, who had been in this interim position since 1945, reported the installation of at least one of the proposed exhibits at the Observation Tower on Bloody Lane. Collaboration on this effort continued during 1950 between Younger, the Washington, DC, national office and the Park Service's Museum Laboratory. In the end, though, nothing came of it for "within one month Younger was dead."[10] Like its experimental predecessors erected by Steele, the disposition of the "experiment" at Bloody Lane is unknown. Progress towards an interpretive approach that integrated a brochure guide with ground markings remained unfulfilled.

This continuing inability to harness the visitor literature with a ground marking system meant that the Park Service's first interpretive brochure, the 1935 version with its "high spot" keys, "continued to be issued to visitors ... and was still in use as late as 1945."[11] It was not retired until about 1948 when yet another version of the original 1940 work was issued, except this time with a much-improved base map as a visitor tool. This November 1948 map was drafted by one John J. Black who also produced maps of the same cartographic and interpretive style for Gettysburg (February 1948) and Richmond (April 1949). In this edition the Union and Confederate lines are demarcated and the direction of the assaults and defensive responses of each corps are noted with the time of day and movement arrows. A. P. Hill's arrival from Harpers Ferry is among the newly added details as is an inset map showing the park's

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9 Steere, Monthly Report, April 1942, quoted in Snell and Brown, *Administrative History*, 206. See also generally Snell and Brown, Administrative History, 206-209 and 244.

10 Snell and Brown, *Administrative History*, 245-246.

11 Associate Historical Technician Ralston B. Lattimore, Inspection of Interpretive Program, Antietam Battlefield Site, April 11, 1941, R.G 79, Box 2602, File 632, National Archives, cited in Snell and Brown, *Administrative History*, 187.



The map in the 1948 (Revised 1949) Antietam Battlefield Guide. (npshistory.com)

location in the larger vicinity. The nascent auto tour route has been extended to conclude at the National Cemetery, which remained the park office and touring center until replaced by the visitor's center in 1963.

It wasn't until 1952 that the initiative of Superintendent Harry W. Doust and Ranger-historian Louis E. Tuckerman finally resulted in the systematic placement of field exhibits: ten troop movement maps located at strategic points around the battlefield. Installed in the summer of 1951, the slanting, semi-horizontal map cases did not fare well between the weather and the visitors: the cases leaked and the glass broke. This

problem was solved by the adoption of an upright case. As reported to the regional director by Region One Museum Specialist J. Paul Hudson, who lauded the "remarkable progress in the field of interpretation at Antietam," the visitor "gets a complete story of the battle, provided he stops and studies the colorful trailside exhibit maps."[12]

Photographs from February 1959 show the exhibits as large-scale maps mounted in upright frames approximately four feet wide by three feet high, suspended about two feet off the ground between 4x4 supports which extend 6 inches on either side above the top of the glass fronted case. A master locator map posted in a display case at the National Cemetery served as a key to the location of the other trailside maps, the distribution of which was as one might expect:

- Hooker's Dawn Attack (located at the northeast corner of Mansfield Avenue
- Sedgwick's Ambush (located on the South Side of the Philadelphia Brigade Park Driveway)
- General Antietam Battlefield Orientation (located across Maryland Route 65 from the Dunker Church)
- Mansfield's Attack (located at the west end of Cornfield Avenue)
- Confederate Counter Attacks in Early Morning Fighting (located north side of Philadelphia Brigade Park Driveway)
- Movement of Sumner's Three Divisions and Confederate Counter Movements (located west end of Bloody Lane)
- The Action at the Sunken Road
- The Final Phase of Battle, A. P. Hill's repulse of Burnside (located at the entrance to the New York Zouave's monument walkway)[13]

12 Museum Specialist J. Paul Hudson, report to the Region One Director, March 20, 1953, quoted in Snell and Brown, *Administrative History*, 269-70.

13 From a photograph of the master locator map display, 1959, Vertical Photograph Files, ANB Library.

Interpretive Map Display: Hooker's Dawn Attack. 1959. (ANB Library)

Being adaptations of the Carman/Cope maps -- enlarged, segmented and simplified – they were amply supplied with graphic and explanatory detail, including troop location indicators, movement arrows and narrative text embedded with numbers cross-referenced to locations on the map. Concerned exclusively with matters of military tactics they required some study to be useful. It wasn't a "big picture" approach so much as it was a large picture with many details. Still, it did contain the seeds of future interpretive initiatives. For even if the display case locations weren't indicated on the park brochure, the mere presence of these graphic displays around the battlefield more nearly satisfied a visitor's need for an explicit cross reference between an explanatory device and the landscape than anything heretofore. To that extent they anticipated the auto tour and wayside station system that we know today.

As much of an improvement as the Doust/Tuckerman tactical map displays were, however, and perhaps because of them, the continuing need for a simplified encounter with Antietam kept making itself apparent. Accordingly, the map displays were supplemented with the installation of reflectorized, 18 by 24-inch lollipop signs. Using succinct action statements, and drawing on the power of place names to confer relevance and meaning, they employed descriptive color to draw in the interest of the uninitiated.

Reflectorized Lollipop Sign: Initial Attack. 1959. Mounted at Poffenberger Farm. (ANB Library)

There were at least seven of these covering the Initial Attack, The Cornfield, West Woods Ambush, the Confederate Left, Bloody Lane, Burnside's Bridge, and the End of the Battle.[14] In their brevity and intense use of language they anticipate the condensed narrative statements that will eventually be carried in future visitor guides and keyed to the auto tour stops, while echoing the "high spots" of the Park Service's first Antietam touring brochure.

With the three-panel brochure and map in hand the battlefield visitor could now consult the eight detailed trailside maps to explain and draw him into the tactical details of the battle. Another seven or so reflectorized signs marked key places and highlights of the battle. Dozens of old Antietam Board directional signs and markers provided other random clues as to the nature of the ground and the meaning of its many discrete places. The 212 cast iron position markers of the Antietam Board, 90 state and unit monuments and a miscellany of other markers and monuments constituted the final layer of interpretive confusion.

Thus was the visitor of 1959 more challenged than equipped.

14 Vertical Photograph Files, ANB Library.

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The initial efforts to standardize the visitor guides for all of the Park Service's military sites commenced in the late 1940s/early 1950s, and extended into the early 1960s. Most of the parks initially had editions that used the template that the 1940-1948 Antietam class of guides was based on, though the application was inconsistent. Many of these then morphed into a second version in the 1950's that was graphically cleaner and often featured some fresh line art meant to evoke an event or characteristic unique to the battle (e.g., river boats at Pittsburgh Landing, in the case of Shiloh). The overall design has the appearance of being less cluttered, an effect achieved by the use of more white space, an improved layout, and better photographs and maps. The shields of the Department of the Interior and/or the National Park Service are more prominently used to anchor one of the panels to assert institutional identity. For the most part this class of brochure employed the two-fold, three panel wide format used for the antecedent 1940-48 Antietam guides, although allowing in some cases for eight pages. It does not appear, however, that any new Antietam guide was issued on this later template. The next edition of the Antietam guide (1967) would be based on a wholly new template.[15]

The now commonplace practice of keying narrative information about a location to a visitor's guide map yet remained embryonic. As uniform as the tour guide "packaging" was across all of the parks it did not extend so much to how the package told the story on the ground. Where the keying technique that later becomes ubiquitous is used at all, it is most often simply a way of locating a prominent site or monument within the park rather than as a means of explaining the military action. To some extent this underscores the default position that had viewed the parks less as sites requiring interpretive services and more as memorial objects.

The marking of the Civil War centennial (1961-1965) and the approach of the 50th anniversary of the National Park Service (1966)

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15 As indicated, it does not appear that another version of the Antietam touring guide was published between 1948 and 1967 prior to the emergence of the new style in the mid-1960s. The 1956 Mission 66 Prospectus uses a 1955 Reprint of the 1948 map on which to prepare a rough sketch of the proposed tour route. See National Register of Historic Places Registration Form, *Antietam National Battlefield Additional Documentation – Mission 66 Era Resources*, National Park Service, December 19, 2017, Section 8–54. http://npshistory.com/publications/anti/nr-antietam-nb-ad-mission-66.pdf.

inaugurated a decade long period of development starting in the mid-1950s that would conclude in the use of common interpretive devices in all the battlefield parks. Having recognized the need to improve its accommodations for visitors and to enhance their experience across all of its properties, the Park Service embarked on a system-wide evaluation, overhaul and improvement program known as Mission 66. Robust Congressional appropriations fueled a huge building program throughout the park system and, in the case of Antietam, the acquisition of land and historic buildings vital to its preservation, as well as the concomitant research necessary to guide those efforts.[16] All of this activity and emphasis engendered an improved comprehension of the events that occurred at Antietam and a new focus on the manner in which those stories were being told to the visiting public.

While the bare bones of the auto tour route as the primary story telling device had been manifest in park literature since 1942, it had been confined to, and had not deviated from, the narrow roads built by the Antietam Board and War Department prior to the Park Service's acquisition in 1933. Besides being narrow and not particularly well engineered, the roads lacked the kind of directional order, automobile pull-outs, parking, and wayside stations that we associate with the tour route today. To rectify this, the final version of the Mission 66 prospectus for Antietam (1957) included a comprehensive plan for the formalization and expansion of the auto tour route, and the creation of the parking and wayside infrastructure necessary to support its interpretive intent.[17]

The proposal for the enhanced auto tour route was part and parcel of the land acquisition strategy that was crucial to the overarching historic preservation efforts, as was the siting of the visitor's center, which was itself a key element of the Mission 66 plan. The visitor center location was central to grounding the visitor experience and as a starting point for the telling of the Antietam story. Opened to the public in 1963, it was an inviting facility where visitors could stop to refresh and orient themselves, obtain park literature for beginning their self-guided tour, interact with Park Service personnel about the tour and the park, partake of the expansive views of the field of battle afforded from the observation room, view the audio-visual presentation in the lower level, and study the other displays presented throughout the center.

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16 Snell and Brown, *Administrative History*, 283-308.

17 *Mission 66 Resources*, Section 8–54.

With the purchase of the Spielman tract containing the Mumma Farm (1961), the gifting of the Mumma Cemetery itself (circa 1962), the reconstruction of the Mumma Lane (1965), the Hagerstown Pike land swap (1962) that enabled the Maryland Route 65 Bypass (1965/66), the building of the Burnside Bridge bypass (1963/64) and its crossing over the Antietam Creek (1965/66), and then the erection of the Rodman Avenue bridge over that bypass (1965/66), the comprehensive tour road and wayside station plan of 1957 was realized in time for the 50th anniversary of the Park Service's assumption of responsibility for Antietam.[18]

The re-engineered tour route debuted in a new generation park brochure in February 1967. For the first time since its appearance 25 years earlier, the auto tour route is firmly institutionalized as the interpretive backbone of the park visiting experience in a numbered system of nine interpretive stops.

Rather than starting at the intersection of the Hagerstown Pike and Mansfield Avenue, the tour commences across the street from the newly constructed visitor's center at the Dunkard Church (which doesn't change to "Dunker" Church until 1977) and proceeds up what is now the "old" Hagerstown Pike, Maryland Route 65 through-traffic having been rerouted to the west. And in a reversal of the interpretive evolution which had been occurring since 1935, the indicia of tactical battle maps -- troop indicators, movement arrows, time indicators – have vanished (for now). It is worth noting that the 1961 wayside exhibit plan anticipated two stops, enroute from the "Dunker Church" to the "The Initial Attack," which would have explored the Confederate defensive and artillery positions at the "Rock Outcropping" and "Nicodemus Heights." These stops were eliminated from the plan with the realization of the 1965 Hagerstown Pike bypass which the 1961 plan had not anticipated.[19]

As originally envisioned, and following its traditional stop in the West Woods, the new route proceeds for the first time along the reconstructed Mumma Lane, although the Mumma and Roulette farms don't appear as wayside station stops until the 1985 edition of the park brochure. Following the stop at Bloody Lane the tour continues south, now crossing over the rerouted Burnside Bridge Road on the new Richardson Avenue

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18 For event dating I have relied on Snell and Brown, *Administrative History*, 314, 317-19, 330 and 353; and *Mission 66 Resources*, Section 8–128.

19 *Mission 66 Resources*, Section 8–96.



The map and text in the February 1967 Antietam Battlefield Guide. (npshistory.com)

overpass, and then proceeding up to the new Burnside Bridge overlook and parking area.

Produced using the economical two-color Duotone process, the 1967 guide was a little larger than a pocket handkerchief when folded. It was three panels wide by two panels high when opened. Printed on inexpensive paper with an unattractive olive drab ink, it was to reign in one version or another, and in one bad color or another (see the 1977 electric blue edition above) until 1980 when it was replaced by a new



The 1977 edition of the Antietam Battlefield Guide. (Library of Congress)

generation design. In addition to being a platform for the auto tour map, the new touring guide provided the visitor with brief, narrative paragraphs keyed to the numbered stops. These descriptive squibs are the brochure equivalent of the reflectorized lollipop signs that had been introduced into the park in conjunction with the installation of the tactical map cases during the 1950s.

In the later 1972 (National Parks Centennial) and 1977 iterations, the blunter graphic presentation of the original 1967 edition gave way to the reintroduction of local roads and historic features such as the critical Millers Sawmill Road (dropped in the migration from the 1948 to 1967 editions), and the place names of the Mumma, Piper and Sherrick farms. And the blitzkrieg arrows of 1948 made their reappearance in the 1975 edition, illustrating the "morning" "midday" and "afternoon" Union thrusts of the battle.

Variations on the Duotone brochure editions emerged across the other battlefield parks over time: Chickamauga/Chattanooga (1968), Vicksburg (1969), Shiloh (1969), Petersburg (1969), Manassas (1971), and Chickamauga and Gettysburg (1973).

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The interpretive significance of the Mission 66 signage erected in the summer and fall of 1966, besides its direct correlation to the wayside



Mission 66 tour route wayside exhibit: the West Woods Slaughter. (ANB Library)

stops on the auto tour map, was its near complete divorce from any former marking system. The new markers are not just extensions of the Antietam Board markers and the Carman/Cope battle maps. They are altogether new things.

Made of cast aluminum, the semi horizontal signs consisted of two types: the basic explanatory, and those of the traditional battle map format. Unlike their predecessors, however, the battle maps are now the essence of the abbreviated style: they have achieved the level of simplicity that Jett and Steere envisioned, in part because of the support system offered by the numerically keyed tour map and the complete elimination of randomness from the tour route. The stops are numeric, specific and quantified. They commit to an interpretation made with a finite number of illustrative points. About three feet square, they used large amounts of blank space to isolate and locate the action, and then used the best kind of "blitzkrieg" style arrows that Steere had advocated.

Smaller signs flanking the larger schematic battle maps are used – and this was new -- to convey the experience of battle. For instance: "A UNION CHARGE THROUGH THE CORNFIELD," is illustrated using line art. In the case of "A CONFEDERATE STAND ALONG THE PIKE," the line art is accompanied by a reproduction of the

Gardner photograph of the Confederate dead along the Hagerstown Pike fence.

As the Mission 66 period came to an end, interpretive development at Antietam passed into a condition of relative quiet, both because the park was administratively subsumed under the C&O Canal National Monument administration from 1967 through 1974, and because the scope of the Mission 66 initiatives, combined with the commemoration of the Civil War Centennial, naturally induced a subsequent period of information absorption and interpretive rest.

When it resumed 15 years later, the advances in the graphic arts and the introduction of economical four-color printing, combined to materially advance the attainment of the Park Service's communication objectives. While the first all color visitor's brochure, published in 1980, shares most of the same content as its forebears, its leap in graphic sophistication renders the material in a far more compact and comprehensible manner. For instance, the accuracy and precision of the cartography, and the use of color to highlight terrain and cultural features, endow the overall presentation with a topographic quality and credibility missing from prior literature.

These capabilities were further extended to visually coordinating the wayside stations with the new literature, the cast aluminum signs from the Mission 66 program being replaced in the mid-1980s with exhibits reflecting the new hyper-graphical style that was manifest in the tour brochure.

Their installation perfected the original ambition of integrating a narrative, a tour route, a map and wayside stations into an interpretive whole that readily facilitated and maintained the visitor's orientation to the landscape and the story. Four interpretive standards, combined with an unusually strong and adaptable graphic platform, have ensured the durability of the accomplishment over time. These relate to the use of narrative voice, the presentation of historical renderings, the provision of a proper temporal context, and the maintenance of simplicity. Accepting the basic chronological pattern as it is framed out by the prescribed auto tour route, the wayside exhibits mostly rely on quotations of battle participants wherever possible, the planning documents for the exhibits having noted that statements that would otherwise be "overly sentimental



1980 Antietam Battlefield Guide. (Library of Congress)

or overly dramatic" are credible when such "value judgments are those of the participants rather than those of the writer."[20]

Because "historical renderings and photographs" are more powerful and credible than contemporary art, the wayside displays also rely heavily on the James Hope eyewitness paintings and the Alexander Gardner "Antietam Dead" photographs. Key waysides also provide a correlation to time through the use of graphically rendered "clock faces" that show the hour and duration of the action. Last, simplified battle maps are integrated into narrative text, artfully blending a "You Are Here" format with a blitzkrieg arrow style to render the military aspect of the battle being addressed.

20 William Clark, Wayside Exhibit Plan, NPS, Harpers Ferry Center, Division of Wayside Exhibits, April 11, 1984, Vertical Files, ANB Library.

Forty years since they were erected only the line art in the wayside exhibits appears dated. Stylistically, they have held up well over time, a credit to the selection of their content and that ubiquitous Park Service graphic style which extends across all of its literature and outdoor exhibits.

With the 1985 iteration of the now iconic Park Service four-color touring map came a new arrangement of 11 tour stops instead of nine. The Roulette and Mumma farm overlooks were added, and the Branch Avenue ("Final Attack") location replaced the Zouave's overlook as tour stop #10, a victim of the chronic hazard of its inadequate parking facilities along the relatively busy Harpers Ferry Road. Since then, the modest adjustments contained in the *2016 Visitor Access and Circulation Plan* notwithstanding, the tour route and its wayside stops have remained largely unchanged.

In the telling of the Antietam story the larger picture has never really been in dispute. Only 22 words separate the "high spots" of the 1935 brochure from the numerically keyed narratives of the 1980 auto tour map and the subsequent editions (up until 2012 anyway when the tour stop descriptions became a bit more full-throated with the doubling of the paper real estate available to print the visitor guide on). In the 90 intervening years since 1933 when the Park Service first assumed the responsibility for Antietam, the objective of correlating the story to the landscape has been achieved in such a way that the casual visitor can, in an afternoon, absent any other resources than the standard touring brochure, obtain a reasonable and reliable sense of, and appreciation for, what happened here and the place where it occurred.

* * *

Everything is interpretive.

In 1964, the park historian built a 6 by 7-foot map with a slotted surface through which fifty, three-dimensional soldiers representing troop units could be moved. A year later, inmates at the nearby Maryland Institution for Men built a plaster relief map of the battlefield as part of their rehabilitation.[21]

Many initiatives are intangible and perishable: school tours, ranger walks, Boy Scout hikes, bicycle tours, audio-visual presentations, living history events, 5K runs, and artillery demonstrations.

21 Snell and Brown, *Administrative History*, 348.



1964 photograph of the plaster relief map constructed by inmates at the Maryland Institution for Men. (ANB Library)

Some are interactive: volunteers painting gun carriages, Elder Hostel workers performing carpentry for restoration projects.

The recruitment of volunteers is itself an act of interpretation.

Some acts are ritualistic, like Memorial Day commemorations, and the now annual Memorial Illumination when 23,000 candles grounded in the bottom of white paper bags along the tour route are lighted to commemorate every soldier killed, wounded or missing at Antietam.

Most initiatives are constructive but not all.

Take the audio stations. There never was a device more calculated to destroy the contemplative ambiance of a battlefield tour than these instruments that began making their appearance in the mid-1960's, one of the misguided initiatives of Mission 66. With the press of a button on the face of boxes built into selected field stone stations, the interior voices of hapless bystanders could be invaded with the narrative equivalent of Musak. For the most part, thankfully, they have disappeared, morphing into the audio tour narratives that can be purchased in the visitor's center gift shop and listened to in the privacy of one's car.[22]

Care of the landscape itself is an interpretive perpetuity with every decision being bracketed between a restoration/preservationist ideal that seeks to replicate the authentic agricultural context of the battlefield ...

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22 Wayside Audio Scripts, Vertical Files, circa 1965-67, ANB Library. There were apparently six such stations: The Cornfield, West Woods Slaughter, Bloody Lane and Burnside Bridge among them.

and a certain proclivity towards creating a park that meets the aesthetic expectations of visitors, authentic or not. Thus, it is that "Class A" lawns are used along the fence rows, around buildings and monuments, and along the roadway shoulders, a practice requiring an army of maintenance workers in season.

Against that there is the slow and careful restoration of the orchards and the woods.

Following on this is the problem of the near universal fondness for trees. Who would take down a spreading maple even absent historical authenticity? It has always been so, even among the professionals. In 1933, Coordinating Superintendent James R. McConaghie, who was also a landscape architect, went so far as to propose "tree planting along the avenues to break the monotony now presented and to give an individuality and greater interest to the avenues."[23] Interpretive reason prevailed.

The removal of the abundant and invasive cedar trees is another matter, and yet their presence can seem appropriately funereal, as where a small grove of them shrouds the 16th Connecticut Volunteer Infantry monument in a chapel-like intimacy.

There were the very tangible interpretive achievements of the Mission 66 program.

The Maryland Route 65 (MD 65) bypass allows that portion of the Old Hagerstown Pike remaining within the battlefield to be free of through traffic despite the regrettable loss of the land over which the new highway was routed, it being a part of the Confederate defensive area where troops were formed before being committed to battle and maneuvered between positions on their interior lines.

The other bypass from this period saved Burnside's Bridge from a ceaseless parade of cars that eroded both the structure and the public's peace. The spot is now one of the most visually pleasing and iconic in the park. Last, and the criticism of its location on a key section of the battlefield notwithstanding, the erection of the visitor's center provided an easily accessible resource and rest area, executed in a design that minimally intrudes on the landscape.

And long before any of this there were the efforts of the War Department's Antietam Board.

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23 Coordinating Superintendent James R. McConaghie, letter to the Director, October 20, 1933, RG 79, Box 2699, File 031-Part I, National Archives and Records Administration, quoted in Snell and Brown, *Administrative History*, 150.

So long habituated have we become to the Board's markers and roads that we forget that they also compose an interpretive system. With the roads especially, we are prone to think of them almost as we think of the battle, as being intrinsic to the landscape. The original purpose of the roads added by the Antietam Board was to give access to the salient features of the field. They also served to provide right-of-way access for the iron markers and, later, for most of the memorial statuary.

In the layout of the roads there was no evident controversy among the Antietam Board members as to the story being told, the points warranting access in the telling, and the best means for connecting the whole. Running roads between the lines was not a difficult proposition in that a large portion of the battle line was defined by those self-same roads. To the extent there was an interpretive center of gravity, it was the stone observation tower at the head of the Sunken Road, between the opposing lines, and nearly equidistant from the flanks of both armies.

The sequencing of the touring road was, as we have seen, a later development, introduced in the 1940's and evolving into the fixed interpretive system of today, reaching from north to south, in three phases, from dawn to dusk, in the current 11 numbered stops. This sequence and its wayside stations now constitute the inescapable arbiter of interpretive perspective. There is no randomness to the tour or to what the tour apprehends. No exploration is required or, for that matter, until relatively recently, encouraged. And while they ante-date the formalization of the tour road sequence, the iron markers and monuments lend their credibility to the sequence merely by their presence along the roads.

Any effort to trump the long-established tour road system, to consider alternative ways of introducing visitors to the battle, must allow for an appreciation of the 1991 General Management Plan (GMP) which sought to do just that by the removal of the greater part of the tour roads. Roadbeds that were present at the time of the battle were to be restored to their mid nineteenth century dimensions and composition, be they macadam or dirt, turnpike or farm lane, and placed off limits to vehicular traffic.

The effort has since been abandoned. Had it been adopted the plan would have fractured the insistent, north to south, sequential movement by leavening it with the restoration of two-way traffic in the heart of the battlefield, and by the installation of a new roadway in the rear of the Confederate line on the northern part of the field. This would have given

visitors a perhaps more logical starting point for understanding the action since the landscape and the battle are in many ways more comprehensible from the interior lines of the defensive posture where the perspective, once established, allows the action to pivot around that point of view. The current tour narrative and layout in the Northern section of the field presumes on the point of view of the Union assault, on what McClellan's army did, and not so much on how the defenders responded or chose their ground.

Nonetheless, the existing tour road and interpretive system is to be counted as an achievement. The directness wished for in the early days of Park Service administration has been realized. The core of the tour road system ensures a constant orientation in time and space to the landscape and the event, at the same time that it allows the visitor the intellectual and emotional room necessary to speculate, consider, brood, appreciate and otherwise respond humanely to the picture of war and purpose that it is the duty of the park's custodians to transmit.

Indeed, the battlefield park tour road itself is now considered as part of the Antietam cultural landscape, to be preserved as part of our understanding of what we remember, and how we remember it.

> The general management plan called for the removal of the visitor center and four segments of the Battlefield tour road system: Starke avenue, Cornfield Avenue, the surviving remnant of Confederate Avenue, and the section of Richardson Avenue paralleling Bloody Land, and following their removal, the restoration of landscapes in those areas. The removal of these features, as outlined in the general management plan, has not been implemented. Now recognized as historically significant elements of the Mission 66 landscape, these features are considered important resource for interpreting the legacy of the Battle of Antietam.[24]

Leavening the insistence of the tour road system, and arguably the biggest shift in interpretive attitudes since the Mission 66 era, has been the gradual development of the walking/hiking trail system within the

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24 *Visitor Access and Circulation Plan, Environmental Assessment*, Antietam National Battlefield, United States Department of the Interior, NPS, March 2018, iv, http://npshistory.com/publications/anti/vis-access-circ-plan-2018.pdf.

battlefield. The opening up – the welcoming of visitor trespass off the sanctioned tour route system – has been a positive development. The *2016 Visitor Access and Circulation Plan* reinforces this trend of the last two decades with the addition of six miles of new trails which, when added to the existing 13 miles of trails (and allowing for 2.6 miles of reductions), results in a 16-mile park-wide system of trails that knits into the whole both newly acquired park owned lands and those with preservation easements. This too is an important achievement and institutionalizes an environmental and landscape dimension to battlefield touring that greatly assists in addressing the challenge of temporal context.[25]

The further in time we get from September 17, 1862, the more difficult it is to give that context to what happened here. The monuments of history recede in size and scale with the passage of time. On the other hand, the preservation of Antietam as a nearly unsullied landscape representative of 19th century rural, agricultural America – the miracle of Antietam's "accidental" preservation – does much in the way of backgrounding the horrific cost of war.

For it is the landscape that is the tangible common denominator between then and now. And if we are able to preserve a simulacrum of the rural life that thrived here prior and subsequent to the battle, and inject it with the stories and lives, not only of those who fought here, but who lived here -- in part through the preservation of their dwellings and outbuildings and the agricultural landscape that they knew -- then we are able to contrast, almost without effort, the blessings of peace against the costs of war, and bring those who walk these paths and roads to better understand, after all the details of battle have fallen away, what happened here and why it is important to the story of America.

25 *Visitor Access Plan*, 22.

In Their Own Words: William H. Humphrey's 1888 Speech on Antietam

by Andy Cardinal

Hiram Berdan gained notoriety during the first summer of the war for raising and organizing two regiments of sharpshooters. He conceived his sharpshooter regiments not as traditional infantry, but as specialized units of skirmishers and snipers.

Berdan recruited companies from all over the north. Once organized, the two sharpshooter regiments contained companies from Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Maine, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin. In addition, there were two Massachusetts companies raised. Intended to be part of the 2nd United States Sharpshooters, they instead served as independent companies attached to other commands. The 2nd United States Sharpshooters therefore went to war with eight companies instead of the regulation ten.

William Humphrey enlisted as a Private in Company E, 2nd United States Sharpshooters, on October 30, 1861. Recruits had to demonstrate their marksmanship skill before being accepted into the specialized companies. As Humphrey later recounted, he had to "take an open sight rifle and shoot one hundred yards and put ten successive bullets into a five inch ring."

By September 1862, the 2nd United States Sharpshooters had seen action attached to Major General Irvin McDowell's corps in the Army of Virginia. "We had been in Central Virginia under Gen McDowell, had been through the battles of Slaughter [Cedar] Mountain, Gainesville, Second Bull Run with several skirmishes and plenty of hard marching beside one Rail Road smash up where we had one man killed and 39 wounded," Humphrey later recalled. "We thought we had seen enough to call ourselves veterans. We had seen some of the better part of war, yet we knew nothing of hardship to what we did after passing through the summer of 1864...."

After participating in the battle at Turner's Gap on September 14, the 2nd United States Sharpshooters went into action at Antietam as part of Colonel Walter Phelps' 1st Corps brigade. At Antietam, the 2nd Sharpshooters fought in line of battle as regular infantry, contrary to their expectation of fighting in skirmish order or as snipers.

The following is from a speech Humphrey delivered in Essex Centre, Vermont, on March 9, 1888. The original handwritten text can be found in its entirety online, courtesy of the Vermont Historical Society. The text that follows has been lightly edited for clarity.[1]

* * *

I was up early the next morning [September 17th]. I could just see in the East the red light of the sun. I knew it would soon be day light. I walked out a short distance. I went through the New Hampshire battery.[2] I passed over but a short distance when I hear a bugle sound which I knew belonged to the enemy. By stooping down I can see a battery moving along by the edge of some woods wheel into position unlimber and seemed to be getting ready for action. I hurry back to the New Hampshire boys. Lieut. Hobbs is in command.[3] I awake him. He jumps up. I show him what I think is going on. He calls on his boys to fall in lively. I get back to my company call out fall in Sharp Shooters, fall in lively. Just then a shell or solid shot comes in among the New Hampshires cutting the throats of two horses. There is no further need of telling our boys to hurry up. They are soon in line. The New Hampshire boys are soon replying to the enemy and soon silence their battery.

Soon an aid comes to our Regt. We are advanced some little distance through a narrow strip of woods and then across a field.[4] While crossing the field shot and shell about us in a careless manner we think. Some of the boys speak how careless they are with their shell while others thought they meant to be careless. There is always someone to get off something to make a laugh even when we were in the greatest danger. I have often thought if it had not been for now and then a good joke cracked just in the nick of time, it would have been hard to have kept the boys in line. Had someone put on a long face and moaned out the horrors of the battle field, the boys could not be kept. They would have broke for the rear and there would have been no way to have [stopped] them. I know many a

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1 See Gerald L. Earley, *The Second United States Sharpshooters in the Civil War* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2009) for general information about the regiment. Humphrey's account can be found at www.vermonthistory.org.

2 First Battery, New Hampshire Battery, commanded by Lieutenant Frederick M. Edgell.

3 Lieutenant Edwin H. Hobbs.

4 Humphrey is describing passing through the North Woods and onto David Miller's farm.

time I would have been glad to run away but pride kept me from doing so. I know that every man in the company would have jeered and [laughed] at me, not myself alone but every one of the company who had any pride for themselves or their friends at home....

After crossing the open field we came to a rail fence. The command is down with the fence. I heard the word down and lay down. As I done so a minnie bullet wounded the man in rear of me, passing through the right breast and arm. Had I not lain down just as I did, I should have received the wound instead of Luke M. Lewis.[5]

Soon the command is [repeated], Down with the fence. We all got up, each man takes hold of the bottom rail, and down goes the fence. We then advance into the cornfield ... and now we hear the command to lay down. We gladly do so.

It is now day light. We can see what is in front of us. As we look about us we see there is quite a piece of level ground. [It] looks like a meadow and is a little ascending, not a sharp ascent but a gradual grade for some distance. There were some fences. Some one of the boys speak of there being so many fences while another says it is not all fence, you can see out there[,] there are troops. There see, there is two lines of battle. See their guns as they glisten in the morning sun light. See they are moving. They are advancing in line of battle, their arms at right shoulder shift.[6] And see, look right down here behind this first fence ... in the lane that runs down to those buildings. There is another line of battle....

Comrades did you ever lay flat on your face in line of battle where you could see the enemy advancing[?] How nervously you grasped your rifle. How often your finger would press the trigger of your gun as some good mark appeared before you. How anxious you were to have the ball open. If so, you know something [of] how I felt laying there that morning. But now all is ready and look right down here, less than 300 yards. See the rebs are arising up to advance. Now the command passes down to the line, Steady boys, steady, hold your fire for close range.

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5 Luke Monroe Lewis was a 22-year-old farmer from Duxbury, Vermont, who enlisted on October 30, 1861. He recovered from his wounds and returned to duty. https://antietam.aotw.org/officers.php?officer_id=20330.

6 Humphrey is probably describing the advance of the front line of Jackson's Division, commanded by Brigadier General John R. Jones. Two brigades, including the Stonewall Brigade (commanded by Colonel Andrew Jackson Grigsby) advanced on the west side of the Hagerstown Pike to confront Brigadier General John Gibbon's brigade. Colonel Marcellus Douglass' Georgia Brigade held position south of David Miller's cornfield east of the pike.

Now the earth seems to tremble as though some infernal force was about to burst fourth or some mighty upheaval of the earth was about to engulf us.

But now from the mouths of many pieces of artillery vomit fourth death hell and destruction but look see[,] see the line of battle down there look some half dozen voices cry look the air is filled with hats caps coats blankets muskets haversacks in fact everything that goes to make up the outfit of the soldier. I saw an arm which looked as though torn from the body and bent in the form of a square and thrown some 30 feet in the air falls back again.

Now the bullets begin to fly over our heads. Our Colonel shouts, Give them hell boys.[7] We give them a volley, but see their color bearer has climbed the fence alone. He is advancing across the field. He wavers, he falls, he endeavors to wave his ... flag in our faces, but he is dead now.[8]

Who shall get the [colors]? Bill Kerr of Company A of our Regiment is some little distance in front of me.[9] Following close to me is Cyrus Howard of Randolph Vt.[10] We are all after the colors but our Adjutant thinks to do something brave.[11] He jumps up and runs down to where the

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7 Colonel Henry A. V. Post. Post was wounded in action and discharged in November. He died in New York City in 1914.
https://antietam.aotw.org/officers.php?officer_id=166&from=results.

8 In his text, Humphrey identifies it as a "lone star flag," but this is likely an error of memory. The Confederate units engaged here at this time were from Virginia and Louisiana. The Texas Brigade would enter the cornfield about 30 minutes later. Carman identifies this as the flag of the 1st Louisiana (Starke 's brigade), but this episode occurs earlier in the chronology Humphrey writes of here than Starke's attack. It is also possible that Humphrey confused the timing of events 25 years after the battle. See Ezra A. Carman, *The Maryland Campaign of September 1862*, vol. 2, *Antietam* (El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012), 80.

9 Private William T. Kerr was an 18-year-old farmer in Maple Grove, Minnesota, when he enlisted in September 1861.

10 20-year-old Cyrus Wright Howard from Royalton, Vermont, enlisted in Company E in September 1861. Howard was wounded in action sometime during the fighting along the Hagerstown Pike. Per Charles Augustus Stevens' 1892 history of Berdan's Sharpshooters, "Silas W. Howard, of Company E, received several gunshot wounds, one through his chest, and notwithstanding he did not expect to survive, took out the fire block of his Sharps rifle throwing it far away so no rebel could find it to make use of the rifle against us." Stevens, *Berdan's United States Sharpshooters the Army of the Potomac, 1861-1865* (St. Paul, MN, 1892), 203. Wright's biographical details from https://antietam.aotw.org/officers.php?officer_id=20332.

11 Lieutenant Lewis C. Parmalee. The 20-year-old had served in the famous 7th New York Militia before the war. https://antietam.aotw.org/officers.php?officer_id=12435.

colors went down he picks them up. The staff is broken close up to the flag. He drops them, draws his sword, jabs it into the broken staff, raises the colors high above his head and starts for our lines. He goes but a short distance when he falls, pierced by 7 bullets.... He falls near Bill Kerr and he reaches out, takes the flag, brings it safely in.

Now some one cries, look over the fence. At our right is the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown pike road with fences on both sides. Next to us is a half wall built of stone with posts set in the wall and boards nailed on the posts. On the other side of the road is a common rail fence while beyond all is a small clearing, then woods. Out of the woods comes the enemy. Quite a number of our boys had now gathered behind the wall as we saw the enemy coming out of the woods. We commenced to fire at them. There was quite a sharp grade that they came down so that it placed them on higher ground. Our bullets told on them. It seemed to me as though every bullet hit the mark. They could not stay longer and face our bullets. They broke for the woods and as they ran up the hill it looked to me as though they went on all fours. As our bullets would strike them they would turn a [complete] somersault and lay down to rest. Our boys would cheer. See they cry, see the dust fly out of their clothing as our bullets strike them[?] As the enemy gain the wood there comes a volley among them. Ah now Meredith Brigade of Indiana and Wisconsin boys are in. They had formed on our right just the other side of the pike. Also Gibbons battery is there just behind the hay stacks.[12]

Now some one calls out, look to our front. The second line of battle comes up.[13] We turn and give to them as our boys cheer. We fall back a little to be in line with others. We keep loading and firing as fast as we can, but see, on they come with arms at right shoulder shift, with heads bowed like men facing the storm. But soon they come in range of

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12 Humphrey refers to the 19th Indiana and 7th Wisconsin, which had moved west of the Hagerstown Pike to drive the Confederates out of the northern portion of the West Woods. Gibbon's battery was Battery B, 4th United States Artillery, commanded at Antietam by Captain Joseph B. Campbell. Initially, only two guns were deployed west of the Pike in front of David Miller's barn. The section was commanded by Lieutenant James Stewart, who assumed command of the battery when Campbell was wounded. Humphrey incorrectly calls it Meredith's brigade, though it was under the command of Brigadier General John Gibbon at Antietam.

13 After Colonel Andrew Jackson Grigsby's Virginians gave way, Brigadier General William E. Starke (now commanding the division after the wounding of Brigadier General John Jones) led two brigades out of the West Woods in an attack toward the southeast corner of David Miller's cornfield. Starke was hit three times during the charge and mortally wounded.

Gibbons battery.... See, they give them round after round of grape and canister. See what great swaths is mown through their ranks. But they close up and on they come, cheering and yelling like devils run amok. Now our officers cry, Give them hell boys. At will we load and fire as fast as we can. No human beings can face such a fire. They waver, they break and run to their rear.

Now our boys cheer and we advance a little. I drop down behind a post. There had been a board fence but the boards had been [knocked] off, the posts left. The third line follows close on to the second. All my ammunition in my cartridge box is gone, 40 rounds. But in my [knapsack] is 100 more. I off with the [knapsack], out with the cartridges, then put my [knapsack] up in front of me to help shield me. The enemy [comes] on. We keep up our fire. I feel some one come up beside me. I look up. It is one of the Wisconsin boys.[14] I tell him to lay down as the bullets are [too] thick to stand up there. The air seems alive with them. He pays no attention to what I say. Soon a bullet pierces his brain. He falls a corpse across my hands, arms and rifle. Dies without a word. In my endeavors to free myself from him I get covered with blood. Oh: the sickening sensation that comes over me as the warm blood flows on to one. I cannot describe it.

Now our boys cheer. They have rallied and are driving the enemy. I jump up [and] pick up my rifle but drop it again. I had fired it so long and so rapid that it had become hot enough to burn my hand to a blister. Now the enemy rally and drive our boys back then our boys rally and drive the enemy back again. I go back to the place where I left my [knapsack] and lay down. I hear some one call. I look around. A short distance [away] lays a rebel Lieut. He asks for water. I creep out to him and give him a drink out of my canteen water that I took from Antietam Creek the night before. I tell him it is from [the creek] but he drinks [and] says it is wet. [He] tells me he is wounded through both legs and cannot walk and that he belongs to a South Carolina Regiment.[15]

I get back to my place [and] keep firing. My hand smarts with the burn but I keep at work. Soon a shell strikes my rebel friend. After the smoke and dirt settle down, I look for him. All I can see is his legs and arms, his body had been torn in pieces.

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14 This unknown soldier served either with the 2nd or 6th Wisconsin.

15 Again, this is most likely an error of memory. Most of the dead and wounded in this area were Louisianians. The Hampton Legion, which was composed of South Carolinians, charged into this area afterward as part of Hood's Texas Brigade.

I see it is getting to be [too] close and warm for me.[16] I fall back. As I am going back I hear my name called. I look and there lays Byron McClellan of our company.[17] He came from Westford Corner. His leg has been nearly torn off by a shell or solid shot. He begs to be carried off the field. He has freed himself of his [knapsack] and other equipments. I undo his rubber blanket to use as a stretcher to get him off with. I look about for help. I see one of our own company. I hail him, then hail two of the 104th N.Y. Each man takes hold of a corner of the blanket and we start for the rear. We did not get but a short distance when one of the New York boys was shot dead. The other dropped his corner and ran. We look [around] for others to take hold. We soon hail two more that belong to some New York Regiment. They take hold. We go on again, but soon one of the New York boys is wounded and he goes to the rear. We three then get our man behind a small stone house that stood near.[18] As the bullets were flying pretty thick we were glad to take shelter. The enemy were advancing. Our boys were in the retreat in some confusion.

I look in my cartridge box. I have only three rounds left. I look around out a short way. I see one of [the] Company G boys of our Regiment laying dead. I take the risk of going out to see if he has any left. I find 10 rounds. I get back behind the stone house again. We would step to the corner fire, step back to load. While one is loading another is firing. We kept up our work. Soon we had quite a crowd, some wounded others were not. Soon some one speaks and says we had best get out from here, we shall all be taken prisoners soon. The wounded plead to be carried off while some few did skip out. As each man [skipped] out some of the wounded [begged] to be taken along. It did seem hard to go and leave them.

I had fired away about all my cartridges – had but two left – when we hear a noise in our rear. I look about. There was the [Pennsylvania Reserves] charging across the field.[19] They soon pass by where we are at

16 Hood's Texas Brigade began its advance into David Miller's cornfield about this time.

17 Byron McClellen (or possibly McClallen) enlisted on November 2, 1861. https://antietam.aotw.org/officers.php?officer_id=20318.

18 A building on David Miller's farm.

19 Humphrey identifies this as the 5th Corps, but it is most likely Anderson's brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves, which pursued the retreating Texas Brigade into the cornfield. The Reserves had served in the Fifth Corps on the Peninsula before being reassigned to McDowell's corps during the Second Bull Run campaign, which may or may not be the source of Humphrey's confusion.

double quick, drive the enemy before them. As they pass by it leaves us so we can [breathe] a little freer. We give them a cheer. They send the enemy back some distance....

We [carry] poor Byron back. He has his legs taken off but he has lost so much blood he lives only a short time. We dig a grave under a large oak tree, roll him up in his own woolen blanket with another that we find, then spread his rubber blanket over him, fill up the grave, mark the place and hurry back to our Company.

When we got back to our Regiment it was almost dark. A good-sized bullock is driven up [and] slaughtered. One days ration – hard bread, coffee and sugar – is dealt out to us. We are where we could build a fire. We done so [and] made a good cup of coffee, the first we had eaten for 36 hours. We picked up ramrods, put our beef on the end and roasted it in the fire. We had a very good meal but a sad one. Of our company only 4 and our Captain were present.

Antietam Artifacts: Lieutenant Arthur Dehon of the 12th Massachusetts Infantry

by Joseph Stahl and Matthew Borders

The 12th Massachusetts was a part of the first wave of Union units that was on the right of Brigadier General George Hartsuff's brigade as they advanced though the Cornfield. The 12th Regiment Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, known as the "Webster Regiment," was recruited in the latter part of April 1861, through the personal efforts of Fletcher Webster, son of the statesman, Daniel Webster. On June 26, Colonel Webster and a large majority of the officers and men of the regiment were mustered into the service.

The regiment saw much fighting over the course of its three years of service. In June 1864, the men started for home and the 12th sent its recruits and re-enlisted men over to the 39th Massachusetts. The returning men reached Boston, July 1, 1864. A week later the regiment was reassembled on Boston Common and was mustered out of the United States service.[1]

At Antietam, the 12th Massachusetts Infantry fought in the Cornfield and East Woods, losing 49 killed, 165 wounded and 10 missing for a total of 224 out of an estimated 325 officers and men.[2] Ezra Carman noted in his history of the Maryland Campaign that, "The regiment advanced about 50 yards beyond the south edge of the corn to a swell of ground trending southwest, then throwing its right 10 or 12 yards farther from the corn than its left, which was about 180 yards from the East Woods. Lawton's main line was not seen until the regiment crowned the knoll and the battle-smoke had drifted away."[3] This movement exposed the regiment to the deadly effect of Confederate fire as, "S. D. Lee's guns tore great gaps in the ranks of the 12th Massachusetts; the musketry fire rapidly thinned it; Major Burbank, its commander, was mortally wounded; the colors and the entire color guard went down in a heap; the

1 The Adjutant General, *Massachusetts Soldiers, Sailors and Marines, Vol. 2* (Norwood, MA: The Norwood Press, 1931), 2.

2 John Michael Priest, *Antietam: The Soldier's Battle* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989), 333.

3 Ezra A. Carman, *The Maryland Campaign of September 1862,* vol. 2, *Antietam,* ed. Dr. Thomas G. Clemens (El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012), 64.

men closed up on the colors, which still lay on the ground, and continued their fire."[4]

Serving in Company F was Lieutenant Arthur Dehon. He mustered in at Boston for three years. Authur had been commissioned as a 2nd lieutenant on January 18, 1862. His service records show present starting with the January/February report. Arthur is shown as present for the rest of his service. The first note in his records was his promotion to 1st lieutenant on May 13, 1862. The September/October report notes that Arthur was absent. However, Brigadier General James Ricketts commanding the division submitted a list of officers and men who behaved with gallantry in the engagements of September 14-17, 1862. In the list for the 12th Massachusetts is Lieutenant Dehon.[5] On September

4 Ibid., 65.

5 Authur Dehon Military Service Records, Field and Staff, 12th Massachusetts Infantry, National Archives and Records Administration, accessed August 11, 2024, https://www.fold3.com/image/320208600/dehon-arthur-page-1-civil-war-service-records-cmsr-union-massachusetts.

23, 1862, he was detached to serve on Brigadier General George Meade's staff. His title was acting adjutant.

Unfortunately, the November/December report shows that Arthur was killed in action on December 13, 1862, at Fredericksburg. The muster out form notes that Arthur was last paid on June 30, 1862[6]. Another source shows that Arthur was born on January 24, 1841, in Boston. He was buried in the Mount Auburn Cemetery, Cambridge, Middlesex County, Massachusetts. He was an 1861 graduate of Harvard and in the book, *Harvard's Civil War*, it references a letter General Meade wrote his wife following Arthur's death: "I have become very much attached to Dehon... it does seem as if good luck that attends me is to be made in the misfortunes of my staff."[6] In General Meade's official report of the Battle of Fredericksburg, he explained the circumstances of Arthur's death, "I dispatched my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Dehon, with orders for General Jackson to move by the right flank till he could clear the open ground in front of the battery, and then ascending the height though the woods, swing around to the left and take the battery, Unfortunately Lieutenant Dehon fell with a ball to his heart just as he reached General Jackson."[7] Meade also wrote that, "The loss of Lieut. Arthur Dehon, Twelfth Massachusetts, my aide, is greatly Deplored, as he was a young officer of high promise, endeared to all who knew him for his manly virtues and amiable character."[8]

Arthur had this image taken by James Wallace Black of 173 Washington Street in Boston, Massachusetts. It is an early war image with a simple photographer's mark and lacking a decorative border on the front, likely taken shortly after Arthur was commissioned in early 1862. Black's studio provided a chair and a decorative drape for his comfort, decoration, as well as to cover the base of a brace that sat behind his chair.

In this comfortable, seated view, Arthur wore his complete uniform for this image, holding his model 1850-foot officer's sword and 1858 forage cap in his lap. His officer's trousers are sky-blue with an eighth of an inch wide, dark blue piping running up the seam. This dark blue was also used for his single-breasted frock coat, eight of its large federal eagle buttons being visible, the ninth likely hiding beneath his sword belt and

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6 Richard F. Miller, *Harvard's Civil War* (Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 2005), 2.
7 *OR*, vol. 21, 512.
8 Ibid., 513.

sash. The sword and sash were indicative of an officer, as were the three small eagle buttons on his left cuff. Finally, his shoulder boards, particularly the left, can be seen. This most obvious symbol of rank has been washed out by the photography process but notice how light the interior of the board is compared to the surrounding coat. That is due to the interior being sky-blue for the infantry. If this had been taken after his transfer to Meade's staff, the interior of his shoulder board would have been the dark blue or black of a staff officer. As a nice touch for the image, Arthur is wearing his white cotton gloves and has tried to comb his wavy hair while giving the camera a determined gaze.

The image is not signed but similar images are in the Massachusetts Commandry of MOLLUS (Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States) and the Civil War Database.

In Antietam's Footsteps: Touring the Miller Pasture
by Michael Hill

As we all know, you cannot really understand what happened on any battlefield without walking the terrain. And until a few years ago, you couldn't walk some of the most important acreage at Antietam. But with the help of American Battlefield Trust and the Save Historic Antietam Foundation, the triangle of land bordered by Cornfield Avenue, Smoketown Road, and the old Hagerstown Pike came into the National Battlefield Park. This allowed the Park Service to redesign its Cornfield Trail to take into account the critical parts of the morning fighting that took place on this tract. An out-and-back walk across this triangle brings into focus much of what happened between sunrise and 10 a.m. when more than half of the day's 23,000 casualties fell dead or wounded.

Begin on Cornfield Avenue at Tour Stop 3. Start by walking north, away from the new triangle of land, into the East Woods along the Park Service trail that actually follows the trace of Smoketown Road in 1862. Go past a small outcropping of rock, hardly noticeable among the vegetation, until the trees thin as you have reached land that's also pretty new to the park and thus only recently replanted. This is where the fighting is going on during the afternoon hours of September 16 as Brigadier General Truman Seymour's brigade of Brigadier General George G. Meade's division peels off from Major General Joseph Hooker's 1st Corps to take on Brigadier General John Bell Hood's Confederate division. Somewhere just ahead of you is where Colonel Hugh McNeil became the first Union officer to die as he urged the 13th Pennsylvania—the Bucktails—forward. About where you are standing is probably where those Pennsylvanians spent a very nervous night after darkness brought fighting to a halt.

Now turn around and retrace your steps, crossing Cornfield Avenue—a road added by the War Department in the 1890s when the park was established—onto the newly-acquired property. The rather scraggly trees here have been growing for only a few years as the Park Service re-establishes the 1862 boundaries of the East Woods. When you get 100 yards or so in, you are around where Hood's troops halt on the 16th. But they don't spend the night. Late in the evening, Hood takes them off the line to go in search of the decent meal they hadn't had for days. In the darkness, they are replaced by the division under Brigadier General

Alexander Lawton. Though the first shots on the morning of the 17th are fired by artillery, infantry fighting begins right here at daylight as Seymour's Pennsylvanians try to resume their advance.

Continue following the trail as it bends to the west, leaving the East Woods and the old route of Smoketown Road. At the time of the battle, all of this land was farmed by David Miller who also tilled the Cornfield. This cleared area was planted in clover, the season's second crop. The first had gone to feed for livestock. This one would have provided seeds for next year's planting. Soon you will join a scraggly line of trees. For now, ignore the two wayside markers and look to the north, toward the cornfield. You are standing along the Confederate line of Colonel Marcellus Douglass' brigade. When the sun begins to rise around 6 a.m. these Georgians peer through the lifting fog as their skirmishers return from the corn. The Stars and Stripes and regimental flags of Brigadier General Abram Duryée's brigade of Brigadier General James Ricketts' division are visible above the stalks. Artillery shells are flying in both directions. When the Union soldiers appear at the worm fence not 200 yards in front of you, the Confederates unleash their first volley. The Union soldiers respond in kind. There is little movement of the lines as they pummel each other for a half hour, both sides suffering tremendous casualties. When Duryee withdraws, the Georgians storm into the corn, only to be driven back to this line by the next brigade of Ricketts' division to arrive. The point-blank volleying continues. Lawton is wounded and leaves the field. Douglass replaces him and is mortally wounded. The Confederates summon their reserve brigade, Brigadier General Harry Hays' Louisiana Tigers, who come up on your right, through the East Woods, where they encounter Seymour's Pennsylvanians and yet another brigade from Ricketts' division. The Louisianans suffer 60 percent casualties. The field in front of you is already a wreckage of humanity.

Continue walking along the path toward the West Woods as it rises up to a flat area near some tall trees. A decade ago, a post-war farmhouse stood here. The Union troops emerging from the Cornfield in front of you belong to Brigadier General John Gibbon's brigade of Brigadier General Abner Doubleday's division. Major Rufus Dawes of the 6th Wisconsin wrote, "As we appeared at the edge of the Cornfield, a long line of men in butternut and gray rose up from the ground." Look toward the Dunker church, the direction they were facing, and you can see how the slope of the land would cause that perception. "Simultaneously, the

hostile lines opened a tremendous fire upon each other. Men, I cannot say fell; they were knocked out of the rank by dozens. But we jumped over the fence and pushed on, loading, firing and shouting as we advanced," right towards where you are standing. "There was on the part of the men great hysterical excitement, eagerness to go forward and a reckless disregard of life, of everything but victory." They rush by you, on towards the Dunker Church plateau.

But danger appears to Dawes' right across Hagerstown Pike as Brigadier General William Starke leads his brigade of Louisianans out of the West Woods and wheels them around to fire into Gibbon's flank. The Union troops change front to face the new threat and the musket fire blazes back and forth across the Hagerstown Pike, the two sides only yards apart. But the Confederates are also taking fire from Union regiments in the West Woods almost behind them as an artillery battery along the Hagerstown Pike is hitting them in the flank. Alexander Gardner's famous image of the resulting carnage is on a wayside on the other side of the roadway. Starke was among those mortally wounded.

It is now around 7 o'clock and Dawes and his troops look to the south and see over 2,000 Confederates rapidly advancing from the vicinity of the Dunker Church. This is Hood's division that had been taken off the line the night before and now is angry that their breakfast has been interrupted. The guns of the 6th Wisconsin are fouling and hard to reload. They and their compatriots offer little resistance, heading back through the cornfield. But on the other side of the Hagerstown Pike, Union troops rally and fire into Hood's flank. The Confederates return the fire. Not 20 minutes before, Union troops had fired from where you are standing at Confederates on the other side of the fenced turnpike. Now it is the reverse. What a crazy, confusing battle.

Almost as quickly as Hood's division went by you into the Cornfield, they came back retreating out of it. In a half hour, almost half of their ranks fell. Now look out over the open field to the east and see more Confederates approaching, first Ohio-born Brigadier General Roswell Ripley's brigade that comes up from near the Mumma farm and hits up against Meade's Pennsylvanians in the Cornfield and is driven back. Then Colonel Alfred Colquitt's brigade of Georgians comes up from the Sunken Road and pushes into the Cornfield, exchanging deadly fire with the troops of the Union 12th Corps new to the battle. Eventually a flanking attack drives them from the corn and they retreat back to the Sunken Road, Union troops in hot pursuit.

It is now past 8:30. Hooker who has been in command of the Union forces is wounded somewhere nearby and taken from the field just as more Union troops arrive. Emerging from the East Woods in front of you is Brigadier General John Sedgwick's division of Major General Edwin Sumner's 2nd Corps, 5,000 troops in three brigades about 75 yards apart, marching as if on a parade ground though one that is filled with the carnage of war. The lines move past where you are standing, getting a bit jammed up as they encounter the fences of the Hagerstown Pike, then getting even closer together as the lead brigade encounters Confederate artillery fire as it moves into the West Woods. At that moment, by sheer coincidence, Confederate troops come through the woods into the left flank of the Union division that is too crammed together to maneuver to face the new attack. In about 20 minutes, the division suffers 40% casualties.

The opening scene of the movie *Glory* takes place right where you are standing. Captain Robert Gould Shaw, who would go on to command the 54th Massachusetts regiment of Black troops, is lightly wounded leading a company of the 2nd Massachusetts that was sent to the aid of Sedgwick. Not far away, its lieutenant colonel, Wilder Dwight, is seriously wounded. He picks up his pencil and paper to finish a letter to his mother he had started early that morning. "Goodbye if so it must be. I think I die in victory... All is well with those that have faith." He dies two days later. The Confederate assault is halted and fighting on this part of the field dies out around 9:30 a.m. after taking the more than 2,000 lives and wounding another 11,000, one casualty per second.

Now retrace your steps back to those two waysides you ignored before. They are placed exactly where Alexander Gardner put his camera on September 19 to take these images. The first depicts the grave of a Union soldier. In William Frassanito's book on Antietam photography, he recounts the remarkable story of finding a photograph of the man buried there, Lieutenant John Clark. But this picture also tells us something about the fighting. Clark was in the 7th Michigan which was on the far left of the middle of the three brigades in Sedgwick's division. Those on the left were hit hardest by the Confederate attack. That he ended up here in the middle of this field showed how they simply scattered in all directions to escape the chaos. As for the dead Confederate in the image, killed at some point in the back and forth fighting for this triangle of land, his name and unit is forever unknown.



(Library of Congress)

Our tour will end with the second wayside, one of Gardner's most haunting images, a white horse that appears to be ready to get up and ride away, but actually lies dead. In the days after the battle, several people noted and commented on this haunting vision. It is not surprising that it attracted Gardner's notice. It is thought to have been the mount of Colonel Henry Strong of the 6th Louisiana of Hays' brigade that suffered so many casualties early in the fight for the Cornfield. Strong was among

them; he did not survive the day. For the rest of that morning, his horse's lifeless eyes looked out on at some of the most horrific butchery in American military history. And the carcass remained there for days, a decaying statue, in many ways the first monument on the Antietam battlefield.

Institute Interview: Sitting Down with Bob Brooks
by Laura Marfut

During the Antietam Institute's 2024 fall conference, participants were treated to a rare look at the Union Ninth Corps' crossing of the Antietam Creek at Snavely's Ford and its subsequent movement into the Final Attack of the Battle of Antietam. This particular excursion took place on private property where a thriving resort called Belinda Springs, a popular destination in the early 1800s for throngs of people seeking the healing powers of the sulphur spring, once stood. Tag-teaming with historian Jim Rosebrock in leading the excursion was Robert "Bob" Brooks (BB), who has lived on the property with his family for 38 years and has spent as many learning its history.

LM: What led you and your family to this historic property?

BB: My wife's parents, Mr. and Mrs. K. S. Midthun, purchased 106 acres of the Belinda Springs Farm in 1963 from Mr. W. S. Griffith, the last farmer-owner. The Midthuns purchased the property as a place to retire. They moved here in 1976 and began more than 40 years of restoration of the buildings and land. My wife and I joined them in 1987 and raised our family here.

LM: What have you learned about the history of the property leading up to the Civil War?

BB: About two miles south of Sharpsburg, the Antietam Creek straightens out into a deep, quiet pool almost a quarter mile long (ultimately, Snavely's ford was built at the mouth of the pool). This pool runs from east to west through a valley, or bowl, that is surrounded on all sides by hills over 100 feet high. On the north bank of the Antietam the floor of this "hidden valley" is a fertile flood plain. There were two natural springs located in this pastoral valley at the base of the surrounding hills. The smaller spring, near the valley's west end, was a limestone spring of "sweet water," cold and good to drink. The larger spring, located at the base of the northern hills near the valley's center, smelled of sulphur and iron and was thought to have medicinal benefits.

These springs would have been known to the indigenous peoples of the area, but I have found no records regarding these springs specifically. The Catawba and other tribes were known to live in this area.

Sometime around the Revolutionary War, Jacob and Belinda Gardenhour (in some records Cartenhover) purchased 138 acres on both banks of the Antietam Creek from Joseph Chaplin, Jr., part of the land

Belinda Spring Hotel, circa late 1800s

grants named Hunting the Hare, Abstan's Forest, Mt. Pleasant, and Cartenhover's Sugar Camp. The Gardenhours named the property Belinda Springs after Mrs. Gardenhour, and built a stone house and a larger log cabin on the fertile plain near the limestone spring.

In the early 1800s, a large wooden-frame hotel and tavern was attached to the home and named the Belinda Springs Hotel. This 17-room hotel was in full operation by the 1820s. The official Washington County celebration of the United States' 50th Anniversary of Independence was held at the Belinda Springs Hotel in July of 1826. However, the popularity of the hotel was short-lived. In the early 1830s, a cholera epidemic swept through Washington County, and in 1832 the Belinda Springs Hotel closed for good.

There is oral history that much of the Belinda Springs Hotel was built and supported by the labor of enslaved persons, but I have not found any supporting documentation of this. In 1973, one of John Snavely's grandsons remembered that Jacob Snavely owned slaves, and that when Jacob died his will distributed his slaves among his children. Jacob's son John received one slave from his father's will, but John was a Whig and opposed to slavery, so he "exchanged (the slave he inherited) for a mule."

The driveway to the Belinda Springs Hotel south from Harpers Ferry Road was used by the public both to access the hotel and to continue on to Myer's Ford (about a half mile downstream from Snavely's Ford) to cross the Antietam Creek and to harvest blocks of ice in the winter.

However, that driveway became a private lane over a hundred years ago. In 1862, many maps still showed Myer's Ford in existence, and the stone wall that lined the side of the road to Myer's Ford played a role in the battle on September 17.

In 1850, the Gardenhours' son John sold the property to Jacob Snavely (in some records Schnebly). Jacob Snavely farmed the land, built a large banked barn near the sulphur spring, and buried the sulphur spring to prevent his livestock from falling in. Because he had property on both sides of Antietam Creek, Farmer Snavely created a shallow, rocky ford to cross the creek with his wagons and farm equipment. This ford was located at the easternmost end of the valley, where the Antietam Creek first enters the long pool. Snavely's Ford was in use in 1862, and was the nearest ford downstream of the Lower Bridge suitable for use by the Union Army on September 17.

LM: You mentioned that most of what you've learned has been through oral history. Where did it come from?

BB: I have taken every opportunity over these last forty years to ask everyone I meet about their memories of Belinda Springs. I have kept a scrapbook of newspaper articles and writings from all periods of Belinda Springs' history. Unfortunately, I cannot recall all the individuals who have told me tales and steered me to good resources, but a number of the articles came from the Hagerstown Cracker Barrel and Herald Mail.

LM: What have you learned about what happened on and near your property during the Battle of Antietam?

BB: The action surrounding the crossing of the Antietam at Snavely's Ford by Union troops, the wounding of General Rodman, and the Union advance up the ravine in the Final Attack are better described by the many historians of the Battle of Antietam. Here are a few comments I will make from my own observations of the property:

It has never been clear to me exactly how the Union troops approached the south bank of Snavely's Ford. Today the bank there is muddy and very steep, dangerous footing for a pedestrian, much less for a horse or a wagon. However, in old photographs I have recently seen, it appears that in the past there was a road track on the south bank of the Antietam heading upstream, or east, from Snavely's Ford. Time may have eroded the land away at the ford, but there is still a passable track on the south bank to the east that can be followed up a gentle slope to what is now Burnside Bridge Road.

The land farmer Snavely tilled on the north bank would have been clear cut at the time of the battle, though it is now very wooded. The ravine north of the ford would have had crops in 1862 and been easy passage for the Union troops. On the crest of the rise to the north of the flood plain and the ford, there is a stone wall that is still in existence today, though now collapsed and overgrown. This stone wall gave shelter to Confederate sharpshooters who rained small-arm fire down onto Union troops crossing Snavely's Ford.

It seems to me that the final action between Union troops at the west end of the Belinda Springs valley, near Myer's Ford, and the Confederate Cavalry under the command of Colonel Thomas T. Munford on the western heights may be underappreciated in significance. New York troops had crossed Snavely's Ford and moved northeast up the steep hill above the ford, where they fired upon the Confederates who were behind a stone wall to their north. Troops from the 4th Rhode Island moved left (west) into the Belinda Springs farm buildings. Elements of the Connecticut 16th and 8th then moved west to a stone wall that bordered the driveway to Myer's Ford. If those Union troops had gained access north up the driveway from the old hotel building to Harpers Ferry Road, the Union forces could have rapidly advanced to the Harpers Ferry Road and, moving north, then appeared on the rear right flank of Major General Ambrose Powell (A. P.) Hill's troops. They might even have been established there when A. P. Hill's men arrived from Harpers Ferry. It was only the concerted resistance of Colonel Munford's men, dismounted and using small arms from atop the rocky heights, with support from Captain Benjamin F. Eshleman's four cannons, that repulsed the Union westerly advance, denied them access to the driveway to Harpers Ferry Road, and turned the Union troops back to the ravine at the east end of Belinda Springs Farm during the Final Attack.

LM: Have you found any artifacts over the years?

BB: The Midthuns have tried to carefully preserve the land and its history. They have not allowed any metal detecting or searching for artifacts.

LM: What are you planning to do with all of the information you have amassed?

BB: I hope in my retirement to record all I have learned about the history of Belinda Springs Farm, and possibly to publish it in book form.

LM: Are there any special plans for the property in the future?

BB: The Midthuns sold a scenic easement covering most of the property to the National Park Service in 1982. The property is currently held in trust for the Midthun family, who wish to preserve historic Belinda Springs Farm for as many years as possible.

LM: What have you learned about the impact the Battle of Antietam had on the civilians on your property and in the surrounding area?

BB: The most vibrant account I have found regarding the Snavely family on the day of the battle was published by Guy Snavely in the *Hagerstown Cracker Barrel* of November 1973, in an article titled "The Snavelys of Sharpsburg." Guy Snavely was the grandson of John Snavely and nephew of John's son Joseph Snavely. Guy recorded the story told to him by his Uncle Joe, who was a 13-year-old boy in 1862 and stayed behind at the Belinda Springs Farm during the battle with three of his brothers. Here is Guy Snavely's memory of the first-hand account of Joe Snavely:

> Many of the Snavelys were Democrats. Grandfather John was an active Whig, and so ardent a partisan that on an election day in Sharpsburg shortly before Fort Sumpter, he received a knife stab wound during a political altercation. When his father Jacob died, Jacob's slaves were divided among his children. The one willed to Grandfather John was exchanged for a mule.
>
> I recall vividly Uncle Joe Snavely's narration of the situation at the Snavely homestead during the day of the Battle of Antietam. When the cannonading started, Grandmother Snavely—the former Lydia Donaldson—got into a skiff at the ford with two-year-old father and his twin sister. She rowed about a mile downstream toward Harper's Ferry to spend the day with Hezekiah Myers, a neighbor whose farm was on the east side of the Creek. Uncle Joe was only 13. He and three other brothers huddled frightened with their big black dog in the large kitchen.
>
> General Ambrose Burnside commanded the left wing of the Union Army. General Joe Hooker was in charge of the right wing. With a bull-headed determination, Burnside charged across the Antietam Creek a short

distance east of Sharpsburg and up a steep hill to reach the ridge which overlooked the Snavely farm. After being repulsed six times by Longstreet's men on the right wing of Lee's Army, he attained his objective on the seventh try.

During one of his futile assaults, one of Burnside's lieutenants was severely wounded. He was carried into the Snavely kitchen and put on the table. While a Union surgeon probed for a bullet and the Snavely boys looked on in terror, Confederate General A.P. Hill and ten thousand fresh troops arrived on the field of battle from Harper's Ferry.

The men in blue retreated, leaving the wounded lieutenant to his fate. He soon died and the boys were in terrible distress. They finally decided to carry him to the ford and drop him into the Creek.

Toward the end of the day, the Union troops were again able to advance as far as the Snavely farm. When they discovered the body of their comrade (in the creek), they threatened Uncle Joe by shouting that if a pistol were found with bullets matching the one that killed the Lieutenant, all the "Johnnie Rebs" there would be shot. Again, the boys were scared to death, but no Confederate weapon was found, and the Snavely clan survived the battle.

Many accounts describe the enormous number of wounded of both armies treated around Sharpsburg in the days following the battle. All the homes and buildings for miles around were used to treat the injured, and it is likely that both the barn and the large hotel-farmhouse of Belinda Springs were occupied as well. John and Lydia Snavely and their large family probably hosted wounded soldiers for a long time after the battle.

LM: Although there is an Antietam Battlefield trail that takes visitors past Snavely's ford, there are no interpretive signs marking the spot. What are your thoughts on the best way to provide interpretation for visitors at that spot?

BB: For many years there were two signs posted on the Snavely's Ford Nature Trail at the curve where the trail leaves the creek and goes up the ravine to the north. One sign said simply "Snavely's Ford" and the

other noted that General Rodman was mortally wounded in the action here. While the sign posts remain today, both of the signs were removed a year or two ago by the Park Service, possibly for repair. It would be nice to have those signs put back up again. A stretch goal I'd like to see would be a larger sign similar to those that the NPS has recently erected in other spots around the battlefield; an interpretive sign to let the visitor know how what they are seeing was related to the events of that day.

Antietam: Then and Now
by Chris Vincent

In 1959, Elmer E. Piper, the grandson of Henry Piper and owner of the Piper farm, sold four lots by Mountain View Cemetery to Rufus U. Darby, founder of Living History, Inc. Later that year, Darby formed the Antietam–Sharpsburg Museum, Inc. and construction began on this property directly across from the Antietam National Cemetery. The following year, Darby purchased the remainder of the Piper farm with plans of developing it into a Civil War-period farmstead. On April 9, 1961, the new museum opened with James V. Murfin, who was the president of the Hagerstown Civil War Roundtable, as one of the dedication speakers.[1]

The museum proved to be unsuccessful, and the company closed in 1963. The company also failed to develop a Civil War-period farmstead and in 1964, the entire Piper farm, including the museum, was purchased by the National Park Service for $75,000. The museum building was then being used by the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal National Historical Park as a maintenance shop until the early 1990s. After the shop was relocated, the building was sold to a local man, who was responsible for the removal and salvage of the structure. However, on the evening of April 29, 1996, the log structure was consumed in a fire that was soon suspected to be arson. Today, the site is the parking lot for the Antietam National Cemetery.[2]

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1 Susan W. Trail, *Remembering Antietam: Commemoration and Preservation of a Civil War Battlefield*, (PhD diss., Univ. of Maryland, 2005), 390–392.

2 Trail, *Remembering Antietam*, 392; National Park Service History Electronic Library & Archive, *NPS Morning Reports/Coalition Reports from 1989-2025.* Retrieved from https://npshistory.com/morningreport/incidents/anti.htm.

Top: Grand Opening Antietam-Sharpsburg Museum, April 9, 1961 (Author's collection); bottom: Museum building on fire, April 29, 1996 (Sharpsburg Volunteer Fire Department)

Site of the Antietam-Sharpsburg Museum, now the parking lot for Antietam National Cemetery. (Author's collection)

Book Reviews

Budiansky, Stephen. *A Day in September: The Battle of Antietam and the World It Left Behind*. W. W. Norton and Company, 2024 Hardcover, 291 pages, illustrated.
ISBN: 978-1324035756. $32.50.

Review by Michael Hill

As Stephen Budiansky acknowledges in his preface, the thematic principle of *A Day in September* comes from a passage Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr. wrote about his visit to the Antietam battlefield in search of his wounded son: "Just as the battle-field sucks everything into its red vortex for the conflict, so does it drive everything off in long, diverging rays after the fierce centripetal forces have met ..." Holmes was moved to write that after seeing the endless lines of straggling and wounded soldiers clogging the roads leaving the battlefield he was approaching. But for Budiansky it has a deeper meaning, that what happened on September 17, 1862 produced "long, diverging rays" that affected not only those straggling soldiers, not only the nearly three years of war that were ahead, but also the country and the world for decades after this battle was fought.

Subtitled "The Battle of Antietam and the World It Left Behind," this is an ambitious undertaking and Budiansky almost pulls it off, causing the reader to think far beyond the maneuvers of brigades, the orders of battle, the calculations of casualties; instead to reconsider what we thought we knew about this day and its importance. Unfortunately, the book's singular failure is in many ways fundamental, seriously detracting from the many important insights in these pages.

Budiansky was clearly inspired by what he learned researching his excellent biography of the wounded soldier Holmes was searching for, *Oliver Wendell Holmes: A Life in War, Law and Ideas.* In that book, Budiansky makes clear the enormous impact that the Civil War in general, and this battle in particular, had on Holmes, how it affected his thinking and his jurisprudence, thus in many ways changing the course of American history during the decades that Holmes served on the Supreme Court. So, it is not surprising that one of the best chapters in *A Day in September* is the one about Holmes as the realities of war and wounds, disease and death force a reckoning with the idealism of his New England



upbringing. And that was true not just for Holmes but for an entire generation of American soldiers whose new perceptions of valor and patriotism were hammered out on the crucible of rifled muskets and double canister, of mud marches and disgusting dysentery. Budiansky beautifully sums up Holmes' reckoning with warfare when, noting that the elderly justice had saved the two bullets taken from his body, he writes, "The futile but beautiful heroism of battle was more important to him as a lesson in the irony of life than as a matter of triumph."

Other chapters are equally insightful. You will never think of Clara Barton as an "Angel of the Battlefield" or anywhere else after reading how she exaggerated her exploits, refused to share credit and generally made a mess of every administrative task she took up. Budiansky has much more praise for the Sanitary Commission, but he goes on to show that whatever the shortcomings of Barton, the Civil War changed forever the role of women in American life.

A chapter on Robert E. Lee also forces a mental reset, contending that it was not some deep, romantic tie to his Virginia homeland that caused him to leave the United States Army and fight for the Confederacy, it was instead a desire to protect his family and their holdings. Budiansky quotes Lee telling his fellow Virginian Winfield Scott, who had just offered Lee principal command of the Union army, that his children "will be ruined if they do not go with their state...all they possess lies in Virginia." Budiansky also notes, with a nod to historian Gary Gallagher for pointing it out, Lee's reaction to the Emancipation Proclamation in a letter to Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon,

saying it "leaves us no alternative but success or degradation worse than death, if we would save the honor of our families from pollution, our social system from destruction."

Jonathan Letterman gets his due in another chapter, his considerable impact on the Army of the Potomac as its medical director put into the narrative of advances in both medicine and public health. James Longstreet is another who gets a reset, praised as the real tactical genius behind Lee, his cool analytical skills contrasted with the fervent fanaticism of Stonewall Jackson. But in the battle for Civil War memory in the South, Jackson was the beloved martyr and Longstreet the turncoat who backed Reconstruction. Alexander Gardner's photographs are put in the context not just of bringing images of the war to the home front, but also of our fascination with the carnage of the battlefield.

And there's an excellent exposition of the Emancipation Proclamation, its place in the evolution of the war, and of President Lincoln. As he does throughout the book, Budianksy quotes some of the most incisive commentary on the war that was provided by a columnist for a newspaper in Vienna, Austria named Karl Marx. He called the Emancipation Proclamation "the most important document in American history since the establishment of the Union." (Marx was also perfectly on target when he wrote, "The short campaign in Maryland has decided the fate of the American Civil War, however much the fortunes of war may still vacillate.")

So, with all this excellence, what's not to like? Unfortunately, in the midst of these many interesting reassessments, Budiansky falls back on tired tropes when considering perhaps the most misunderstood principal of the Maryland Campaign, George McClellan. There's a basic mistake near the beginning of the chapter on McClellan when his $10,000 salary at the Illinois Central Railroad is said to be the equivalent of $5 million today. Actually, it's about $380,000. Not that important, but it sets the tone for what's to come as the analysis devolves into standard stuff: not only is he arrogant and overpaid, he's also slow and cautious and hesitant to commit his troops to battle. Plus, he always overestimates the strength of the enemy, etc. etc. Yet somehow that same timid general sent his troops into a battle against an enemy he was told had him outnumbered that turned out to be the bloodiest day in American military history. A more insightful analyst would have noted that's certainly an odd way to evince caution.

As with most of McClellan's critics, Budiansky overemphasizes the importance of finding Special Orders No. 191, evoking the standard commentary on McClellan's tardy response. In lieu of footnotes, each chapter has a short essay on sources and Budianksy says he got this timeline from Edwin Fishel's 1992 book *The Secret War for the Union*. But Fishel relied on the then-standard understanding that McClellan sent a telegram reporting finding the orders to Lincoln at noon on September 13. We now know that McClellan didn't get the orders until well into the afternoon and sent the telegram at midnight, which completely changes the timeline.

Budiansky also criticizes McClellan for not attacking on September 15 when Union troops first arrived on the banks of Antietam Creek before Jackson's troops were up from Harpers Ferry. But what if he had? James Longstreet's troops could have retreated to Williamsport, Jackson could have joined them there and Lee's Maryland Campaign would have been back on. Instead, two days later, as Marx put it, the fate of the American Civil War was decided. That's the type of imaginative thinking you see in many other chapters, but not in this one.

One could go on and on picking apart this book's critique of McClellan. And certainly, some of the criticisms are justified. But the point is this: Budianksy's strength is that he makes you think again about issues you might have thought were decided. He had the opportunity to do that for McClellan's generalship. But he didn't and that's a shame. Because it might have made *A Day in September* a great book. As it is, it's still a good one.

Hippensteel, Scott. *Rocks and Rifles: The Influence of Geology on Combat and Tactics during the American Civil War.* Switzerland AG: Springer Nature, 2019. Hardcover, 321 pages, 39 black & white, 105 color illustrations, index.
ISBN: 978-3-030-00876-5. $119.99.

Review by Richard P. D'Ambrisi

The study of geology and its impact on the strategy, tactics, and combat of the American Civil War should not be overlooked. Anyone familiar with the South Mountain and Antietam battlefields appreciates the significance of the terrain on the strategy and tactics employed there. Robert E. Lee used the landscape structure of the region in choosing the invasion route for the Maryland Campaign of 1862, in executing a delaying tactic at South Mountain, and in selecting the location of his army's positions at Antietam. The rolling terrain on the upper portions of the Antietam battlefield prohibited General George B. McCellan's Union Corps commanders from observing the actions of their colleagues, and coordinating and supporting their attacks, while also offering cover and concealment for the soldiers on both sides during the fighting. On the southern end of the battlefield the Antietam Creek crossing and subsequent rugged terrain hampered the Union advance. The landscape where the South Mountain and Antietam engagements occurred also provided effective artillery positions with wide fields of direct fire.

This book discusses the relationship between geology and fighting during the American Civil War, explores the difference in rock types between several battlegrounds and how these rocks influenced the combat, tactics, and strategies utilized by commanding officers and their soldiers. It reveals the influence of geology on landscape features and terrain in an historical context showing how terrain was largely determined by the underlying rocks and how they weathered. By contrasting major differences in rock types at ten Civil War battlefields, the author illustrates how such terrain formations helped shape warfare.

The study is divided into three parts: Igneous, Metamorphic and Sedimentary rocks. Part II: Metamorphic Rocks, Chapter 5 devotes 11 pages to South Mountain and Part III: Sedimentary Rocks, Chapter 8



devotes 34 pages to the Antietam battlefield. There are references and additional reading suggestions at the end of each chapter.

Hippensteel's study begins with a brief introduction to the geological history of the eastern United States, and if you are like most readers with minimal geology knowledge, the nomenclature presented in the book will be a new experience. However, readers lacking an advanced knowledge of geology should have little difficulty understanding the main concepts. Within each chapter is a strategic level background overview and operational and tactical summary of the battle followed by a natural history of the geology of the battlefield and surrounding area along with a more focused examination of those tactical aspects most affected by geology.

Scott Hippensteel's *Rocks and Rifles* successfully applies geology to Civil War military history. Knowledge of the ground is essential for any given battle and this study provides an authoritative perspective on the ten battlefields covered. While the textbook format and price of this publication seem directed more towards higher academic institutions, the book is full of maps, tables, charts, and diagrams providing much to be learned concerning geology and its impact on Civil War combat.

The growth of interdisciplinary studies like this topic on military geosciences is a welcomed development in Civil War scholarship. Logistics and supply, maneuvering into place, and military engagements were all impacted by terrain. The content of this book adds to our understanding of the geologic landscapes at South Mountain and Antietam battlefields.

Contributor Biographies

Tom Clemens earned a doctorate from George Mason University, where he studied under Dr. Joseph L Harsh. Tom taught for years at Hagerstown Community College, retiring as professor emeritus. He edited and annotated Ezra A. Carman's narrative of the Maryland Campaign of September 1862, which has received several awards. Tom is the founding member and current president of Save Historic Antietam Foundation Inc., a nonprofit battlefield preservation organization, and is an Antietam Battlefield Guide.

Wilson H. Beebe, Jr. first found his way to the study of Civil War memory and commemoration through *Patriotic Gore*, Edmund Wilson's writings on the literature of the period. Retired from his career as a trade association executive and lobbyist, his essays on the Antietam battlefield have developed out of his 30-year study of, periodic visits to, and particular appreciation for Antietam and the Maryland Campaign area. Married and a resident of Red Bank, New Jersey, he is a Navy veteran and holds a BA in English Literature from Fordham University.

Andy Cardinal has had a lifelong interest in the Civil War. After graduating from Hiram College with a BA in History, he has spent the last 28 years as a public school teacher and administrator in Ohio. He lives in Garrettsville, Ohio, with his wife Melissa and two children, Mandy and Jared. This is the first time he has been published. He would like to thank Jare Cardinal for her assistance in transcribing the text.

Joseph Stahl retired from the Institute for Defense Analyses. He is active in the Civil War community and has authored more than two dozen articles. He has coauthored five books, including most recently *Faces of Union Soldiers at Culp's Hill: Gettysburg's Critical Defense.*

Matthew Borders is a graduate of Michigan State and Eastern Michigan University. Matthew Borders holds a BA in United States History and an MS in Historic Preservation. He briefly taught before accepting a position with the National Park Service's American Battlefield Protection Program. He is a certified battlefield guide for Antietam National Battlefield and Harpers Ferry National Historic Site and president of the Frederick County Civil War Round Table. A founding

member of the Antietam Institute, currently Matthew is a Park Ranger with the National Park Service. He, along with fellow guide, Joe Stahl, has published multiple books in their *Faces of Union Soldiers* series.

Michael Hill spent 35 years as a reporter and editor at the *Baltimore Evening Sun* and *Sun*, including four years as a foreign correspondent in Africa where he covered the election of Nelson Mandela, the Rwandan genocide and a wide variety of other stories. A native of Atlanta, where he grew up on the battlefield of Peachtree Creek, he came to Baltimore to attend the Johns Hopkins University and never left. He has been a certified Antietam Battlefield Guide since 2021.

Laura Marfut is a retired United States Army colonel with master's degrees in International Relations and Education, and a Master of Strategic Studies degree from the U.S. Army War College. She has been a Certified Antietam Battlefield Guide since 2019.

Chris Vincent is President of the Antietam Institute and Chief Guide of the Antietam Battlefield Guides. Chris is a 24-year veteran of the United States Army, where he took part in combat operations in Desert Storm and Kosovo. His ancestor fought with the 132nd Pennsylvania at Antietam. He holds a master's in military history from American Military University. Chris owns and operates the historic Rohrbach Inn. Many thanks to him for his sponsorship of our seminar.

Richard P. D'Ambrisi has been an American Civil War civilian living historian and museum docent since 1986. He has developed mid-19th century characterizations for an apothecary, phrenologist, railroad worker and baseball player that have been presented at Civil War reenactments, vintage baseball tournaments, museums, and historic sites. He is a Certified Interpretive Guide with the National Association for Interpretation.

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